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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a heady time to be working in intellectual property and Internet
issues. The legal developments have been fast and furious, with
something of what must have been the feeling of working in civil rights
law in the 1960s and '70s, in environmental law in the '70s and '80s, or
railroad law in the '80s-I mean the 1880s. Like environmental law,
there is a sense with the Internet that our decisions are fraught with
unforeseen consequences and path dependency-that we are making
choices now that we are unlikely to turn back no matter how suboptimal
the situations become. And like civil rights law, there is a feeling in
intellectual property law that issues are being decided that will have a
huge impact on democracy, free expression, and the kind of civil society
we are going to live in.
Recently, there were some posters around our law school asking
students to participate in a student bar association survey. The tag line
was, "And like one of your law school exams, there are no wrong
answers." Being fairly new to the ranks of professors, no one told me
about this. There are supposed to be no wrong answers? There are lots
* Justin Hughes is Assistant Professor of Law at Cardozo School of Law, New York, and the
2003 Hosier Distinguished Visiting Professor in Intellectual Property at DePaul College of Law,
Chicago, IL. My thanks to Statira Ranina, a former student now in practice, for her expert
guidance on points of Indian law. My greater thanks still to Graeme Dinwoodie, Cynthia Ho,
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of wrong answers and in the early Internet age, professors, law and
otherwise, have been providing plenty of them-estimates and guesses,
tomes and talks, plodding prose, and glistening sound bites that are
frequently less correct than we would have liked.
All these not wholly correct guesses have been a very good thing. It
is a testament to these heady times-and the willingness of legal
academics to jump into the issues-that we have gotten so very much
wrong. Let us consider three ways in which legal academics may have
missed the mark. The first, discussed in Part II, bears on the formation
of copyright norms for the Internet domestically-and how legal
scholars appear to have overestimated the receptivity of courts to certain
arguments. Part III then discusses the formation of transnational legal
norms and the ways in which American professors appear to have
underappreciated how the Internet is prompting a round of deeper
transnational legal harmonization than we have seen in the past.
Finally, Part IV poses a question about a different meta-norm: What
is the proper norm or role for professors, law and otherwise, in these
ongoing policy debates? Even if there is no "right" answer to this
question-one in which we can all believe-surely the question is
worth asking for the sake of "the process of intellectual openness
itself."'
II. RAILROAD LAW VERSUS CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
The comparison of law grappling with the Internet at the end of the
twentieth century and law grappling with the railroads in the nineteenth
century is not new. 2  In the nineteenth century, railroads stitched
together our national economy, producing a quantum leap in the amount
of economic and social interaction among Americans. The Internet
appears to be producing another quantum leap in communications and
the delivery of information goods. And the economic effect of railroads
at the end of the nineteenth century and the Internet at the end of the
twentieth century are similar in another respect: in each case, irrational
exuberance led to overbuilding, with enormous losses for investors, but
1. ROBERT NozICK, INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD 6 (2001)
("Belief is not the only coin of the philosophical realm. There are new classifications and
analyses and understandings, and there is the process of intellectual openness itself.").
2. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Legal Education: A Perspective on the Last 130 Years of American
Legal Training, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 157, 170 (2001) (noting that nineteenth century
"society was transformed by the railroad, ours by the Internet"); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes
Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 312 (2002) ("Like
cyber-technology, the railroads stretched the law and tested its ability to address both new and
developing issues.").
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with valuable infrastructure created for the rest of us, whether or not
these are consumers or new businesses that will thrive on what has been
created.3
In drawing this multiple comparison to civil rights,
environmentalism, and railroad law, one thing is for sure: the literature
of practicing lawyers-bar publications and the trade press-has
focused on the economic impact-the railroad law aspects of the
Internet-while the "cyberlaw" literature of legal academics has tended
to view Internet law with the idealism of the first two areas. Law
professors have often thought of intellectual property and Internet issues
with an almost civil rights law mentality-a grand struggle to establish
rights, reshaping society and the balance of power between
corporations and individuals.
There is nothing surprising in this-professors are supposed to think
in terms of the broad concerns of society; practicing lawyers must
resolve, on a daily basis, the problems of their clients. But somewhere
along the way, the legal academic community began making arguments
that have had near zero influence with the judiciary-the people who
are supposed to be thinking both about the specific issues brought
before them and the broader concerns of society. You want the best
indicator of how an American court will decide a major intellectual
property case in the Internet era? Look for the amici or parties' brief
with the dozens of law professors-those theories are how the court will
not decide the case.
Each of the recent cause celebre copyright cases-Napster,4
Aimster,5 Reimerdes,6 Eldred,7 and Grokster8-must be explained on its
own terms, and law professors filed amici briefs in only some of the
cases, but for the intellectual property "low protectionist," these cases
are a cumulative track record worthy of General McClelland. Ten times
before the bench resulted in nine losses for the low-protectionist side.
3. See, e.g., J. Bradford DeLong, Profits of Doom, WIRED, Apr. 2003, at 90 (comparing the
benefits to the economy of money-losing railroads in the late 1880s with the dot-corn and telecom
bubble of late 1990s).
4. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. I11. 2002), aff d, 334 F.3d 643
(7th Cir. 2003).
6. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub
nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
7. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999), affd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.
Ct. 186 (2003).
8. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
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The judicial body count is not much better: low-protectionist arguments
were made to twenty-six judges and carried the day with only four.9
One could add or subtract various cases for various reasons,10 but the
wave washes over us the same way.
A low protectionist could look back on this with the darkly poetic
phrase of an old warrior, "it was a glorious war, every battle lost." But
surely it is better to try to understand what happened. When one looks
at the losing arguments in Reimerdes, Napster, and Eldred, they are
arguments that saw much more constitutional structure in the copyright
system (particularly the Copyright and Patent Clause) than courts have
been willing to entertain. When courts unpack the copyright system,
they do find elements reflecting-and working in synch with-our free
expression system. But the judges have found nowhere near the
theoretical mother lode that law professors envisioned.
To some degree, law professors responded to the information age
explosion of the 1990s with an information jurisprudence,l l which
often included a highly elaborated vision of (a) how law should and
should not channel information flows, and (b) how organic law-
constitutional law-required information flows to be channeled. A
huge theoretical edifice-or constellation of edifices-was constructed,
one that courts have largely declined to embrace. But all this work was
not simply a wrong guess executed in groupthink. Perhaps the greatest
miscue as to the courts' receptivity to such a jurisprudence was the
9. The Grokster case is currently on expedited appeal before the Ninth Circuit, so the head
count of judges could suddenly improve modestly to 22 to 7.
10. For example, one might want to subtract the Aimster decision because it seemed to follow
largely from the Napster decision, but if we did that, we should also take the Grokster decision
off the list-the one time when a federal district court adopted low-protectionist reasoning. And
one might want to add Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., where the Federal Circuit
maintained, against the arguments in an amicus brief filed by a group of law professors, that
contract law could be upheld to prevent reverse engineering that would otherwise be permissible
under copyright law. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc of
Defendant-Appellant Baystate Technologies, Inc., Bowers (Nos. 01-1108, 01-1109), available at
http://www.acm.org/usacm/Briefs/bowersVbaystatebrie.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
11. The phrase was coined by several people, including Marci Hamilton. See Marci A.
Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 605, 613-14 (2000)
(noting that the Supreme Court has not developed a "conscious information jurisprudence");
Marci A. Hamilton, The Distant Drumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the Information Era, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 259, 264 (2002); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness,
Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 443, 456 (2001) (describing an "information jurisprudence" in relation to insider
trading laws); Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1341 (2001) (reviewing cases that illustrate "FTC information
jurisprudence").
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Supreme Court's unanimous decision in the 1991 Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.12
Feist is now familiar to practically everyone who studies or works in
intellectual property. The defendant, Feist Publications, had sought to
create a regional telephone directory for northwest Kansas,
encompassing telephone numbers from smaller areas served by eleven
different local telephone companies. 13 Rural Telephone was the lone
holdout, refusing to license its telephone directory information for
inclusion in Feist's larger work. 14 Feist proceeded to copy Rural
Telephone's entries-over 1,300 entries verbatim and an additional
3,600 entries in part. 15 Rural Telephone sued, and the case eventually
arrived at the Supreme Court, where the Court noted in almost
deceptive modesty, "This case requires us to clarify the extent of
copyright protection available to telephone directory white pages."'
16
Despite the extensive copying, Feist's final telephone book shared
neither the same selection nor the same arrangement as Rural's: Rural's
copyright claim rested solely on extensive copying of the factual entries
themselves. 17 The Court held that these entries-whether considered
individually or en masse-were not protected because they were not
within the meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act's "original works."18
If the Court had stopped there, Congress could have amended the
Copyright Act to extend copyright protection to non-creative, "sweat-
of-the-brow" works. Instead, the Court also held that facts could not be
protected by copyright law as a constitutional matter. 19 The Court
reasoned that the Constitution's provision for protecting "writings" of
"authors" forbids copyright protection of unoriginal works.20
12. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
13. Id. at 343 ("The Feist directory that is the subject of this litigation covers 11 different
telephone service areas in 15 counties and contains 46,878 white pages listings-compared to
Rural's approximately 7,700 listings.").
14. Id.
15. Id. at 343-44.
16. Id. at 342.
17. Id. at 343-44.
18. Id. at 363-64.
19. Id. at 350-51.
20. Id. at 346. The Court said:
Originality is a constitutional requirement. The source of Congress' power to enact
copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to
"secur[e] for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings." In two decisions from the late 19th century--The Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879); and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)-
2003]
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As an analysis of copyright law per se, the Feist decision was not on
the most solid ground. The Court was interpreting statutory law and
constitutional law, but both use copyright concepts derived directly
from the common-law tradition: "original work" in the case of the U.S.
copyright statute and "author" and "writing" in the case of the U.S.
Constitution. As an interpretation of those concepts, Feist arguably is
flawed. Subsequent decisions from courts in Australia, Canada, and
India have implied as much.21 Just a year before Feist, the English
Magill case made it clear that pre-E.U. Database Directive English
copyright law afforded substantial copyright protection to
comprehensive databases.22 So Feist could not be seen-and was not
seen-as an exegesis on self-contained copyright concepts derived from
the common law.
In Feist, the Court went much further than it had ever gone in prior
cases in elaborating an "information flow" vision of the relationship
between Congress' power under the Copyright and Patent Clause and
society's constitutionally guaranteed interests in free expression. In
prior opinions, particularly Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises,23 the Court had told us that there were First Amendment
aspects to both the fair use doctrine and the fact/expression (and
idea/expression) dichotomies. But in Harper & Row, the copyright
edifice turned back the First Amendment attack.24 In Feist, the First
Amendment concerns had bite. A doctrine that seemed to be the very
this Court defined the crucial terms "authors" and "writings." In so doing, the Court
made it unmistakably clear that these terms presuppose a degree of originality.
Id.
21. See Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. (2002) 199 F.C.R. 491 (reviewing Feist
and subsequent cases in the United States and Canada), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2002/112.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2003); CCH
Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2002] 4 F.C. 213 (finding copyright in "sweat of the
brow" works by law publishers), available at 2000 C.P.R. LEXIS 93. For an Indian case
subsequent to Feist, see Burlington's Home Shopping Ltd. v. Chibber (1995) Patent & Trademark
Cases 278 (noted in Pravin Anand, "Burlington's Home Shopping Ltd v Chibber," 6 ENT. L. REV.
159 (1995), in which the Delhi High Court, not following Feist, held that a computer database of
mail order customers (names, addresses, telephone and fax numbers) was protected as a
compilation within the definition of literary work). See also Justin Hughes, The Personality
Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 99-
106 (1998) (discussing the "melding" of the concepts of originality and creativity).
22. See Radio Telefis tireann v. Magill T.V. Guide Ltd. [1989] I.R. 554, 572 (Ir. H. Ct.)
(finding copyright protection for BBC's weekly television program schedules).
23. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
24. At least that is how the case is commonly understood. See, e.g., Kevin Georing, Panel
One Commentary, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 193, 196 (2000) ("The Court in the Harper & Row
case against The Nation rejected any First Amendment limitation other than as part of the general
fair-use test.").
[Vol. 35
Of World Music and Sovereign States
embodiment of intellectual property's concern to create incentives for
intellectual labor-the "sweat of the brow" doctrine-fell before the
expression/fact dichotomy. 25  While the dichotomy is an internal
regulatory mechanism of the copyright law, there is no question that it is
a First Amendment instrument.26 Feist taught us that copyright and the
First Amendment must dance together-and that the First Amendment
leads.
In retrospect, the Feist opinion's scrutiny of copyright through First
Amendment lenses helped inspire a decade of law professors thinking
and writing about how copyright could/should be made responsive to
constitutional concerns. Some scholars addressed the general shape of
limitations on copyright inherent in article I, section 8, clause 8.27
Other work explored the specifics of protecting databases (which is
what the telephone book in Feist was), 28 considered privacy and the
attendant freedom of readers, 29 focused on the First Amendment as a
trump on copyright, 30 or continued the pre-Feist discussion of how
25. The Feist case was not a great fact pattern for a tough decision between conflicting goals
of information production and information dissemination. Rural Telephone did not need any
economic incentive from copyright law to collect the facts; it generated the phone numbers and
the databases as a function of being a operating telephone company. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S.
at 343 ("As the sole provider of telephone service in its service area, Rural obtains subscriber
information quite easily. Persons desiring telephone service must apply to Rural and provide
their names and addresses; Rural then assigns them a telephone number."). Nor did Rural
Telephone need an incentive to publish the resulting database-state regulation mandated the
publication of the phone book by whomever had the (lucratively profitable) local telephone
service. Id. at 342.
26. As the Court noted in Harper & Row, "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression."' Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 556 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2dCir. 1983)).
27. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Restraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119
(2000); Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and
Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); William Patry, The Enumerated Powers
Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 359 (1999); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,
112 YALE. L.J. 1 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Economic and Constitutional Influences on
Copyright Law in the United States, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 409 (2001).
28. See Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
535 (2000); Malla Pollack, The Right To Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture
of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999).
29. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" Systems in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
30. See Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its
Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147
2003]
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copyright impacts democratic discourse and/or artistic development.3'
Although the issues were very different, the Eldred case took the shape
it did partly because of Feist.
The arguments made in law professors' briefs in the big 2000-2003
copyright cases mentioned above reflected that rich body of 1990s
theoretical ideas about the relationship of copyright to civil society,
democracy, and personal autonomy. In the Reimerdes case, over forty-
five law professors supported a brief arguing two issues: (a) that the
limitations inherent in the Copyright and Patent Clause forbade
Congress from writing the anti-circumventions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") in the broad terms in which they
were crafted, and (b) that the First Amendment independently would
limit permissible copyright protection from extending to broad anti-
circumvention laws.
The amicus brief in the Eldred case-signed by fifty-three law
professors of all political persuasions-made a similar bifurcated attack
on the twenty-year extension of copyright at issue in the case. In both
cases, the professors' filings made straightforward, precedential
arguments; these were not overly-theorized, scholarly articles converted
into the format of a brief. There was, perhaps, only one inadvertent sign
about how self-contained the scholarly work of the 1990s had become:
unlike most briefs, the law professors' brief in Eldred cited more law
review articles than cases (forty-four to forty-one).3 2
(1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright in the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (2001).
31. For other important literature exploring the need for copyright to encompass concerns of
democracy, civil society, and individual self-development, see Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and
Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Netanel, supra note 30. This literature had
begun well before the Feist decision. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects
to Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991);
Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE
L.J. 455 (1991); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
32. The professors' brief in Reimerdes did not suffer from this problem: it cited fifty-seven
cases and fourteen scholarly sources. Brief Amicus Curiae of Intellectual Property Law
Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants, Supporting Reversal, Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-9185), available at 2001 WL 34105194. In the
Eldred case, to make a comparison with the professorial amicus brief, the Intel amicus brief-
itself principally a policy argument-cited nine cases and only two pieces of copyright
scholarship (one being the Nimmer treatise). Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corporation in Partial
Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at 2002
WL 1041860. The petitioners' reply brief in Eldred cited thirty-three cases and eleven
intellectual property scholarly works (including two treatises). Reply Brief for the Petitioners,
Eldred (No. 01-618), available at 2002 WL 31039334. In fairness, the extensive citations to
legal scholarship in the law professors' Eldred brief probably reflected inclusive impulses-that
the thoughtful work of as many of the signatories as possible be shown.
[Vol. 35
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What will happen next? Of course, there will be an initial flurry of
Eldred postmortems, most emphasizing the life raft Justice Ginsburg's
Eldred opinion threw at, if not to, the opponents of increasingly strong
copyright. In turning back the First Amendment attack on the twenty-
year term extension, Justice Ginsburg noted that when "Congress has
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary" 33-a phrase causing many to
wonder what those "traditional contours" are. But after those
postmortems, I think there will be a decline in the number of articles on
the civil society/democracy/personal autonomy ramifications of
intellectual property. In Judge Posner's recent and somewhat biting
observation, "Disputes over intellectual property, as the Supreme Court
just reminded us, are not profitably conducted in the idiom of the First
Amendment."34  Copyright has shown itself fairly resistant to free
expression claims-not just in the United States, but also in Europe.35
In fact, a few people drawn to intellectual property by these concerns
may peel off, moving into other areas of the law.
That does not mean that there are no constitutional arguments to be
made about copyright and the Internet. In a recent article, Pam
Samuelson lays out a variety of constitutional issues regarding
expanded copyright laws that are still unsettled. 36  Some are
democracy/personal autonomy arguments that have already had an
unsuccessful trial run in lower courts (such as a facial challenge to the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions as being beyond the scope of
Congress' copyright power), 37 while other issues are completely open.
For example, Congress' treaty power in relation to the express grant of
power in the Copyright and Patent Clause (to restore copyright in works
that fell into the public domain) is a completely untilled field. So too,
by definition, would be the constitutionality of any substantially new
33. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 774.
34. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2003).
35. See, e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Dutch Copyright Law 1995-2000, 187 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 110, 149 (2001) (reviewing a 1999 Netherlands court of
appeals decision, Anne Frank Foundation v. Het Parool, which held that the freedom of
expression guaranteed in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not
override the copyright in Anne Frank diary pages). See generally P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright
and Freedom of Expression in Europe (describing developments in the conflict between
copyright and freedom of expression laws in Europe), in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 343, 346-60
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/
hugenholtz/PBH-Engelberg.doc (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
36. Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
37. Id.
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attempt by Congress to establish extra-copyright protection of
databases. 38
But in light of Eldred, if there is going to be any significant new
reaction from mixing copyright and First Amendment, it will come at us
after an "information flow" jurisprudence is more filled out outside
intellectual property. A constitutionally grounded "information flow"
jurisprudence is still in formation, the Court's 2001 Bartnicki v. Vopper
decision being a case in point. 39 While the Bartnicki opinion signals
that this body of information jurisprudence is going to be built slowly
and cautiously, 40 it is worthwhile to read and reread Bartnicki with
problems like DeCSS-and copyright doctrine in general-in mind.
The copyright decisions in the past few years declined to embrace the
vision of many legal academics because, perhaps, they had become too
visionary. In this sense, in the intellectual property area, activist legal
academics have not enjoyed as much influence in the formation of
domestic legal norms for the Internet as they might have. Where law
professors have been inclined to see civil rights and issues that need to
be resolved as a matter of society's organic law, judges have been
inclined to see railroad law-questions of regulating economic forces
best left to legislators.4 1
III. GLOBAL RAILROAD LAW
If the problem described above was one of legal academics reaching
too far, the next story is one of legal academics initially not reaching far
enough.
Because the initial wave of immigrants to cyberspace was
overwhelmingly American-both natural and juridical persons-novel
legal issues about the Internet have usually been tested first in American
38. Id. See generally Benkler, supra note 28 (analyzing congressional power to regulate
information production and exchange); Pollack, supra note 28, at 40-89 (discussing the
constitutional limits on database protection). For my own views of the constitutionality of
different kinds of database protection in light of Feist, see Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright
Protection of Databases Can Be Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 209-14 (2002).
39. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
40. Discussing prior information disclosure cases and the present dispute, the majority noted
that "[o]ur refusal to construe the issue presented more broadly is consistent with this Court's
repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished
consistent with the First Amendment." Id. at 529. Of course, the Court has ruled that "truthful
publication" may be "punished." See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985).
41. Indeed, the one low-protectionist victory, the Grokster decision, amounted to the judge
concluding that the record companies' arguments needed to be addressed to the legislation, which
could change the contours of contributory liability. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster,
Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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courts between American actors. Not surprisingly-and despite the
"global" rhetoric-when American academics began paying attention to
the Internet, it felt like a wholeheartedly American institution.42 The
Internet was "global" in the way Star Trek was inter-galactic: for being
distant planets, all the sets looked surprisingly familiar and, despite the
funny costumes, everyone spoke with American accents-and concepts.
Whether by accident or an invisible hand of intellectual selection, the
initial wave of legal scholars drawn to the Internet was mainly experts
in American constitutional, criminal, commercial, and copyright law. I
have often wondered what the first years of "Internet law" scholarship
would have looked like if the first people on the scene had been scholars
established in international or comparative law, not experts in U.S.
contract and constitutional law. 43
Even today, a novel cyberlaw problem is statistically likely to happen
first in the United States or, more broadly, in a common-law
jurisdiction. Survey information for 2002 puts Americans at 42.65% of
Internet traffic, dwarfing number two China (6.63%) and number three
Japan (5.24%). 44 Add Commonwealth jurisdictions and a majority of
Internet traffic still occurs among English-speaking children of the
common law.45 If American legal scholars have been too Americentric
about the Internet (and there certainly have been exceptions), this is a
good explanation for the myopia.
The United States will remain the single largest, monolingual,
legally-integrated economy on the Internet for a few years, but only a
few. By one estimate, by as early as 2005, Americans will only be one
quarter of all Internet users. 46 By another estimate, Chinese speakers
42. This also caused, in some countries, the perception of the Internet as yet another American
intrusion into local or national societies. See, e.g., ANDRt LUCAS, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET
NUMtRIQUE 7 (1998) (noting "a little polemical debate" in France over whether the Internet is a
"vehicle for American thinking").
43. A point made in Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV.
359, 360-61 (2003) [hereinafter Hughes, Persistence of Law].
44. China Second to US in Web Traffic: Study, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/08/01/1028157806643.html (Aug. 1, 2002).
45. Together, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada are a bare majority of Internet
traffic: 50.52%. Id. A reader may quibble that much Canadian traffic is Qudbdcois and,
therefore, French and civil-law oriented; but then one would add Australia, New Zealand,
Singapore, Ireland, Kenya, Nigeria, India, and South Africa (the last four being common-law
countries with English being the vastly dominant language of Internet users).
46. Michael Pastore, Global Internet Population Moves Away from US, CYBERATLAS, at
http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big-picture/geographics/article/0,,591 1_558061,00.html (Jan. 11,
2001).
2003]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
will be a majority of Internet users by 2007.47 As a sign of things to
come, the presidency of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN") passed in 2003, for the first time, to a non-
American. 48
This emerging reality of the Internet appears to be forcing more
express consideration of how national legal systems resolve similar
problems differently. Generally speaking, transnational economic
actors have an interest in having such differences smoothed away, while
a range of other players have varying stakes, pro and con, in such
"harmonization." Recently, in discussing intellectual property, French
commentators Michel Vivant and Agn~s Maffre-Baug6 have made a
similar observation. Seeing the tension between private actors that want
to circulate goods and services freely via the Internet and nation-states
that still rely on territorial control, Vivant and Maffre-Baug6 conclude:
This gives an indispensable characteristic to the adoption of rules that
are convergent, if not common, whenever possible. In truth, this
means of harmonization has, for a long time, been relied upon by
States. But the "Internet phenomenon" seems to make alternative
formulae emerge which one will need to consider for a moment. 49
But two points should be noted. First, this will be far from complete
convergence; convergence is not "indispensable" if important
constituencies learn to live with-and perhaps even seek to maintain-
specific differences among national systems. Second, there are both
different ways to think about this convergence and different ways this
convergence is occurring.
American legal academics are increasingly turning to the
international and transnational legal aspects of the Internet, but they
have generally done so well after policymakers were already grappling
with its transnational characteristics. Perhaps this is because, for a
certain time, many academics and intellectuals were caught up in a
heady ethos of the Internet being immune to law or requiring a wholly
47. Frances Williams, Chinese to Become Most-Used Language on Web, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, available at 2001 WL 31428030.
48. Australian Paul Twomey replaced American Stuart Lynn. See Declan McCullagh, ICANN
Names New CEO, CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-
993390.html?tag=st-m (Mar. 19, 2003); see also James Pearce, New ICANN Chief Open to
Change, CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1032-993451.html?tag=fd-top (Mar.
20, 2003).
49. Michel Vivant & Agnes Maffre-Baug6, Internet et la Proprit4 Intellectuelle: Le Droit,
l'Information et les Riseaux, LES NOTES DE L'IFRI 59 (Institut Franqais des Relations
Internationals, Paris, June 2002); see also LUCAS, supra note 42, at 13 (recognizing that a
comparative law approach is necessary to the minimal harmonization of law needed on the
Internet).
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reconceptualized system of rule-governance. Elsewhere, I have called
these the "no law Internet" and the "kingdom of the Internet" visions. 50
It was hard to resist visions like this when social scientists and
commentators all around us were opining pearls such as "[clyberspace
is Platonism as a working product" 51 and "[t]he Net wires the world for
Hegelian Geist. "52
While much popular and intellectual writing explored these visions,
Congress, companies, and diplomats were busily engaged in a more
pragmatic project of translation-bringing laws, sometimes kicking and
screaming, into the Internet environment. This project of translation or
transposition of law53 was not undertaken because these people are
hostile to utopian visions, but because transposition of laws into the
Internet environment was what constituencies and litigants were
demanding. Children were getting unprecedented access to
pornography and libeling, if not threatening, school administrators;
political dissidents were getting unprecedented access to
information-and libeling, if not threatening, their regimes. People
were trading, selling, and "sharing" things-music, antiques, trade
secrets, Nazi paraphernalia-often things they did not have or did not
have the authorization to sell, trade, or share. The effects of cyberspace
first spilled into meatspace. It was then that reality-law-bit back.
Consciousness of the transnational legal issues triggered by the
Internet has now taken better hold among American academics,
particularly with hot topics like copyright law and jurisdiction.54
Internet "governance" is another such area, principally in the form of
ICANN,55 although it merits pointing out that ICANN is itself a
creature of American policymakers confronting a problem first: how to
50. Hughes, Persistence of Law, supra note 43, at 364-72.
51. Michael Heim, The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace (comparing Plato's well known story
of the cave to cyberspace), in CYBERSPACE: FIRST STEPS 64 (Michael Benedikt ed., 1991).
52. MARK C. TAYLOR & ESA SAARINEN, IMAGOLOGIES: MEDIA PHILOSOPHY, at Simcult 2-3
(1994) (referring to the way in which the Internet's global span has created a medium that could
give rise to absolute knowledge).
53. Here I use "transpose" in the musical sense of writing or performing a composition in a
key other than the one in which it was originally written or in the linguistic sense of translation,
not in the sense of reversing the order or words-something that could have deleterious effects on
most laws.
54. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
346-47 (2003).
55. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 93 (2002) (criticizing U.S. government efforts to devolve control of the
domain-name system "root" as intended to keep ultimate control while maximizing the
government's deniability and distance); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using
ICANN To Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DuKE L.J. 17 (2000) (same).
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devolve control of the Internet away from the U.S. government and
toward the international community. 56
Yet to date, we have seen very little discussion-or meta-
discussion-about the mechanisms of convergence of law that the
Internet has triggered. Let me present a simple taxonomy of five ways
legal norms are converging (or not)-that is, transnational legal norms
are forming-via the economic and social force of the Internet.
"Convergence" itself is a term and concept enjoying popularity across a
wide range of commentary and scholarship, used to describe business
practices, biology, and epistemology-not to mention the idea of
"convergence" in electronics and communications. 57  That last use is
most relevant to our discussion here because as different media and
technological systems converge, legal systems often must be melded,
harmonized, or "converged."
In a recent paper, I presented an earlier version of this taxonomy of
four (ontologically ambiguous) "ways" that legal norms are being
formed.58 But we might also think of this as a taxonomy of narratives,
with more than one narrative having explanatory power vis-i-vis the
development of a particular legal norm. There may be a few different,
equally credible ways to tell the story of the development of any
particular legal norm.
A. Top-down Convergence: Treaty-based Development of Legal Norms
The most familiar form of convergence is the "top-down" kind in
which a multilateral treaty is negotiated and countries ratify, then
implement, the new legal norms of the treaty regime. Perhaps the best
example of top-down convergence of Internet-related laws has been the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") copyright treaties
crafted in December 1996-the WIPO Copyright Treaty ("WCT") and
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty ("WPPT").59
56. Properly put, the problem was and still is how to devolve control of the Internet away
from the U.S. government and toward the international community (a) while avoiding existing
U.N. and multilateral structures that Americans find to be a morass, and (b) in a method that,
once it began, the U.S. government could still control the pace and extent.
57. See, e.g., Ken Belson, 65 and Just Itching for a Little Convergence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2003, at CI (describing Sony's president as "an undaunted preacher for convergence in music,
movies, games and communication in all forms"), available at LEXIS, News Library, The New
York Times File; Mark Landler, Sony Is Selling Convergence, but Will Europe Buy It?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
58. Hughes, Persistence of Law, supra note 43, at 363.
59. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65
[hereinafter WCT], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/wct/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2003);
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
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The WCT and WPPT protections are principally intended to make
three basic additions to international norms of copyright law. These
three new legal norms of international copyright law are: (a)
generalizing existing rights of distribution, broadcast, and public
performance into more generic rights to "make available to the public"
or "communicat[e] to the public"; 60 (b) creating obligations about the
protection of "rights management information"; 61 and (c) creating
obligations vis-A-vis "technological measures" that copyright owners
use to control access to and use of their works. 62 The last of these has
been by far the most contentious, the debate spilling over into the fourth
narrative I will describe below.
Top-down convergence for Internet legal norms may have reached its
apogee in the 1990s, when the international bureaucratic community
was flush with the successful negotiation of the the Marrakesh
Agreements establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 63
There was a certain amount of public and private expertise (lobbyists) in
the United States and Europe which had ramped up for those
negotiations: after 1995, that community of experts was in need of
work. People are perhaps more sanguine now. For example, one
commentator, looking at the fast pace of developments on the Internet
and the eight years needed to negotiate the WTO Agreements,
concluded that "harmonization of legal standards is not a realistic
solution for global information issues. 64
Of course, that kind of statement assumes that top-down convergence
is the principal--or only-way to harmonization, a mistake too easily
made. Top-down convergence is arguably the most transparent
formation of transnational legal norms. That may make it the easiest to
study and chronicle. Top-down convergence is also arguably the
method of forming transnational legal norms that allows well-organized
activists to exert the most pressure with the least resources-for that
reason, it might come to be disfavored by those with more resources. A
great example of this was the burst of activism that scientists and
researchers released against database protection at the 1996 WIPO
36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT], available at http://www.wipo.int/treafies/ip/wppt/ (last visited
Oct. 4, 2003).
60. WCT, supra note 59, arts. 6, 8.
61. Id. art. 12.
62. Id. art. ll.
63. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 2 (1994).
64. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 577 (1998).
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Diplomatic Conference, thereby stopping that subject from being
included in the WIPO copyright treaties that emerged. 65
B. Model-based Emergence of Legal Norms
In contrast to negotiation of a binding multilateral treaty, there is a
"soft" form of top-down formation of transnational legal norms for the
Internet: the development in an international forum of a model law or
set of principles that gain widespread adoption. An extremely
successful example of this has been the Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy ("UDRP") for addressing disputes between
domain-name ("DN") registrants and trademark holders. 66  Another,
arguably less successful example has been the 1996 United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model Law
on Electronic Commerce. 67
The problem of the relationship between trademarks and domain
names emerged early in the legal consciousness of the Internet. The
classic "cybersquatting" situation arises when one party controls a
domain name that is substantially the same as another party's
trademark. Typically, the domain-name holder registers and/or
maintains control of the domain name with either an intent to sell the
domain name to the trademark holder or an intent to profit from Internet
traffic that would come to a domain name that is a famous trademark.
Courts have been consistently and uniformly unsympathetic to such
cybersquatters, but to reach reasonable results, judges-whether
American, French, Chinese, or Australian-often stretched traditional
trademark doctrines 68 or applied other doctrines. 69
65. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 81 (1997); Justin Hughes, Political Economies of Harmonization: Database
Protection and Information Patents (July 8, 2002) (paper presented at the Institut Frangais de
Relations Internationales, June 10, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlabstract=318486
(last visited at Oct. 6, 2003).
66. See, e.g., ICANN, UDRP, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last
updated Feb. 2, 2002).
67. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, G.A. Res. 162, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/Res/51/162 (1996), available at www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/
ml-ecomm.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
68. See Porsche Cars N. Am. Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
enactment of the ACPA [Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act] eliminated any need to
force trademark dilution law beyond its traditional bounds in order to fill a past hole .... );
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 2000) (the ACPA "was
adopted specifically to provide courts with a preferable alternative to stretching federal dilution
law when dealing with cybersquatting cases"); see also GAUTIER KAUFMAN, NOMS DE DOMAINE
SUR INTERNET: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES 122-23 (2001) (noting that some courts "artificially"
treated the domain name as a good or service in order to apply French trademark counterfeiting
law); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
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In 1999, WIPO produced a report on how to handle these disputes in
the generic top-level domains ("gTLDs"). That report became the basis
for ICANN's UDRP, a mandatory but non-binding administrative
arbitration procedure for all domain names in the .com, .net, or .org
environments.7 ° Under the UDRP, a trademark holder can recover a
domain name in one of these gTLDs by showing that (a) the domain
name is similar to the trademark, (b) the domain-name holder lacks any
intellectual property or legitimate business rights in the name, and (c)
there has been bad faith in the registration and use of the domain
name.71 The UDRP then provides a non-exhaustive list of evidence for
and against "bad faith" registration and use.72  While the UDRP is
triggered by a domain name being "identical or confusingly similar" to
a trademark, the bad faith requirement means, as Graeme Dinwoodie
observed in his remarks at the Symposium, that unfair competition, not
consumer confusion, is the agreed foundation for the UDRP.
Although the UDRP continues to suffer from the occasional poorly
reasoned decision 73 and is often charged with some degree of pro-
trademark holder bias, it is the most powerful example of lex Internet
through a model law to date. Officially created only for the three large,
unrestricted top-level domains or gTLDs-.com, .net, and .org-the
1687, 1701 (1999) ("Courts have also stretched trademark doctrine to accommodate the extreme
case involving Internet domain names and 'cybersquatters."'); Preston M. Torbert, Commentary
on Inter IKEA Systems v. International Network of Information Co. (July 11, 2000) (describing
Chinese judges' stretching trademark law to rule against a cybersquatter of an IKEA trademark),
available at http://www.bmck.com/ecommerce/china-cybersquat.doc (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
69. For example, in CSR Ltd. v. Resource Capital Australia Pty Ltd. [2003] F.C.A. 279 (Fed.
Ct. Austl.), available at 2003 WL 1790032, the court applied the Trade Practices Act to rule
against a cybersquatter in possession of CSRsugar.com.au. Id. 1 42. The court noted that there
would be "a real difficulty in relief being given under the Trade Marks Act" because it could not
be said that the defendant, through mere registration of the domain name, had "used the domain
name as a trademark in relation to goods or services in respect of which CSR had registration or
for that matter closely related to either goods or services referred to in the CSR registrations." Id.
As long as the domain name was simply warehoused, the Australian Trade Marks Act did not
seem to apply. Id.
70. See THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN),
UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE-RESOLUTION POLICY, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
policy-29sept99.htm (Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter UDRP].
71. Id. art. 4(a)(i)-(iii).
72. Id. art. 4(b).
73. See ANDRE R. BERTRAND, LE DROIT DES MARQUES, DES SIGNES DISTINCTIFS ET DES
NOMS DE DOMAINE 578-83 (2002) (noting "the numerous contradictory decisions rendered on
identical facts" [les nombreuses decisions contradictoires rendues a propos de faits identiques]
and the very broad definition of "trademark" used by WIPO UDRP panels); Laurence R. Heifer
& Graeme Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2002); see also A. Michael Froomkin,
ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 605 (2002) (offering a critical assessment of UDRP's development and early cases).
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UDRP's principles have quickly been adopted for new generic TLDs74
and, much more importantly, have become the basis for dispute
resolution standards in over thirty country-code TLDs ("ccTLDs").
Some, like Mexico and Venezuela, have adopted the actual UDRP
mechanisms and arbitral institutions 75_a phenomenon explained, in
part, by the economies of scale involved in handling these disputes.
Some, like Japan and Singapore, have adopted the UDRP verbatim or
almost verbatim.76
Other economies on the Internet have shown themselves to be under
the UDRP's soft influence. Britain's .uk TLD formulates its policy in
terms of "abusive registration" of a domain name, but the list of factors
bearing on this question bears a strong resemblance to the UDRP and
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"). 77
Malaysia uses a two-part test, mimicking UDRP's article 4(a)(i) and
(ii),78 but does not really leave out 4(a)(ii); instead, the domain-name
holder may prove its registration and use "was not in bad faith by
establishing... rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name." 79
In India, the National Centre for Software Technology ("NCST"), the
authority for the .in ccTLD, has promulgated domain-name rules that
replicate UDRP Article 4(a)(i) and (a)(ii), and then replace the general
"bad faith" provision of 4(a)(iii) with some specific examples of bad
faith--including attempting to sell the domain name or warehousing it
74. For example, paragraph 4(a) of the Start-up Trademark Opposition Policy (STOP) for the
.biz gTLD repeats the UDRP three part test. NEULEVEL, INC., START-UP TRADEMARK
OPPOSITION POLICY AND RULES FOR .BIz, at http://www.neulevel.biz/ardp/docs/stop.html
(revised Sept. 19, 2001).
75. BERTRAND, supra note 73, at 579 (also counting Romania, the Philippines, the Bahamas,
and Cyprus as countries that have adopted UDRP arbitration at WIPO for their country TLDs);
see also KAUFMAN, supra note 68, at 177-78 (listing names of countries adopting arbitration).
76. When Singapore adopted dispute resolution procedures to deal with claims of
cybersquatting in the .sg space, the Singaporeans adopted ICANN's Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy almost whole cloth, but added a distinct mediation procedure. See
SING. NETWORK INFO. CTR. (SGNIC), SINGAPORE DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION
POLICY, at http://www.nic.net.sg (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter SINGAPORE DRP]. The Singaporeans
did, however, add a mediation process: paragraph 4(e) provides that the parties will be invited to
consider whether they wish to have the dispute mediated by the Administrative Panel before the
Administrative Panel is called upon to decide the dispute, then sets out procedures for such
mediation. Id. para. 4(e).
77. NOMINET.UK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE POLICY arts. 3-4, at
http://www.nominet.org.uk/ref/drs-policy.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
78. MALAY. NETWORK INFO. CTR. (MYNIC), DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
art. 5.2(i)-(ii), at http://www.mynic.net.my/mydrp/MYDRP-apr03.PDF (2003).
79. Id. art. 7.
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for one year or more. 80 While the NCST's provisions can be criticized
as being ambiguous and potentially failing to cover all genuine
cybersquatting situations, 81 the influence of the UDRP is evident.
China has experienced a two-step process of moving toward the
UDRP standards. In August 2000, the Beijing Higher People's Court
promulgated guidelines to lower court judges 82 stating that "[b]ad faith
registration and preemption of other people's well-known trademarks
are acts... to which the General Principles of the Civil Law apply and
which the Unfair Competition Law regulates." 83  The Beijing Court
guidelines then, in effect, reproduced the UDRP examples of "bad
faith."84
This decision still forced international entities facing cybersquatting
in the .cn TLD with recourse only to Chinese courts. In September
2002, this changed with the establishment of a "Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy" by the China Internet Network Information Centre
("CNNIC"), which administers the .cn domain-name registry. The new
CNNIC Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("DRP") applies to
both Roman character and Chinese character names in the .cn
environment (including .com.cn, .org.cn, and .net.cn). Some
commentators have called the standards in the CNNIC system
"reminiscent" of the UDRP, 85 but that is an extreme understatement. A
complaint under the CNNIC DRP requires the following conditions to
be proved:
80. NAT'L CTR. FOR SOFTWARE TECH., INDIAN INTERNET DOMAIN NAME DisPuTE
RESOLUTION POLICY § 7, at http://domain.ncst.ernet.in/disputepolicy.php (last modified July 16,
2003) [hereinafter IDNDRP].
81. The IDNDRP is ambiguous because section 7 does not make it clear that 7(a) [parallel to
UDRP 4(a)(i)] and 7(b) [parallel to UDRP 4(a)(ii)] are conjunctive-both conditions should be
fulfilled, while 7(c) through 7(f) should be disjunctive-any one condition should provide the
foundation for a domain-name dispute. Id. The IDNDRP is further ambiguous in that 7(e) says
"[a] complaint for cybersquatting has been received" without specifying what "cybersquatting" is
or whether the complaint can be something that was filed in an Indian court. It appears that
India's new trademark law does not provide any further guidance on cybersquatting. See Ashu
Thakur & Ketki Shah, Domain Names and Protection of Trademarks-The Indian Trademarks
Act, 1999, and Other Dispute Resolution Avenues, 7 LEGAL EYE (A.R.A. Law Advocates &
Solicitors, Mumbai, India, Nov. 2002) (on file with author) (describing the status of Indian
Trademark and domain-name law).
82. See Guidelines Set Forth for Hearing Cybersquatting Cases, CHINA PAT. AGENT (H.K.)
LTD. NEWSL., at www.cpahkltd.com/Newsletter/DomainCase.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2003)
(translating the Beijing Higher People's Court's August 2000 guideline for hearing
cybersquatting cases (also translated as Guidelines for "Vicious Domain-Name Registration")).
83. Id. art. IV.
84. See Hughes, Persistence of Law, supra note 43, at 379-80.
85. Gabriela Kennedy & David Taylor, Prepare for China's Domain Name Explosion, 128
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 35, 37 (2003).
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i. the disputed domain name is identical with or confusingly
similar to the Complainant's name or mark in which the Complaint
[sic] has civil rights or interests;
ii. the disputed domain name holder has no right or legitimate
interest in respect of the domain name or major part of the domain
name;
iii. the disputed domain name holder has registered or is being
used [sic] the domain name in bad faith. 86
In short, China is using the same standards for .cn that apply to the
.com environment with the exception that the conjunctive condition of
the UDRP's third element (registered and is being used in bad faith) has
been changed to a disjunctive standard (or)-a pro-trademark owner
amendment that one commonly sees in the most recent wave of UDRP
descendents. 87 As with the UDRP, CNNIC chose to permit different
entities to serve as arbitral authorities in overseeing the CNNIC DRP,
with at least two independent institutions already appointed: the Hong
Kong International Arbitration Centre and the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC") in Beijing. 88
Both institutions have records in arbitrating claims between Chinese and
non-Chinese entities, 89 increasing the transparency of and confidence in
the CNNIC system.
Arguably, the United States is the principal outlier in all of this,
having passed its own ACPA in 1999. It would be too Panglossian to
claim that the ACPA reflects the UDRP standards; the relationship
between the two systems for handling trademark/domain name is more
complex. One perspective-what I think should be the dominant
perspective-is that the ACPA and the UDRP are both manifestations
of the same ideas formulated circa 1999 about what everyone could
agree upon as the "bad faith" that constitutes "cybersquatting." Thus,
the ACPA's nine-factor test for bad faith hones close to the UDRP's
understanding of the conditions that should trigger a domain-name
86. H.K. INT'L ARBITRATION CTR., CNNIC DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY,
at http://dn.hkiac.org/cn/cne-policy.html (Sept. 30, 2002).
87. The same change from the UDRP appears in Singapore's dispute resolution procedure.
See SINGAPORE DRP, supra note 76, para. 4(a)(iii).
88. Kennedy & Taylor, supra note 85, at 38.
89. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Foreign Lis Alibi Pendens, Non-Chinese Majority Tribunals and
Other Problems of Neutrality in CIETAC Arbitration, 13 ARB. INT. 63 (1997) (describing the first
CIETAC arbitration with a non-Chinese majority arbitral tribunal).
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transfer.90 Where the ACPA now arguably seems to be in conflict with
the UDRP is in the ACPA's in rem procedures. 91
C. Invisible Hand Convergence: Environment-based
Emergence of Legal Norms
In the next narrative of covergence, legal norms for the Internet
emerge without any intervention by international bureaucrats. In this
story, convergence occurs because of market (or environmental) forces:
either the economy adopts new legal norms within a very limited
spectrum of possibilities or the economy will not enjoy significant
development of the Internet (as its technology presently exists). One
example of this is basic legal treatment of electronic signatures and
documents; another example is limitations on Internet service provider
("ISP") liability for third party conduct.
Contract law, particularly concerning consumers, is highly
developed, highly localized law, but there are some baseline
components of contract law where parallel convergence can be
expected. These are legal uncertainties that must be solved before there
will be widespread electronic contracting; for instance, what do we do
in the Internet environment when contract law requires a "document," a
"writing," a "signature," and "delivery" of one or more of those things.
It was self-evident from the beginning that the digital, networked
environment either failed to meet these requirements92 or could not be
assumed to meet these requirements. And as with many areas of law, an
uncertain legal environment could dampen activity as much as a certain,
hostile legal environment.
90. The ACPA has a non-exhaustive nine-factor test, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000 &
West Supp. 2003), which is very similar to the conditions of UDRP article 4(a) and (b) together.
91. This conflict is all the more irrational because the United States "arguably stands to lose
the most from the segmentation of the domain name system [and] should pursue international
coordination of domain name regulation, rather than the extensive assertion of jurisdiction found
in the ACPA." Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace:
Problems with the Anticyber-Squatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 989,
993 (2002). For just these reasons, the Clinton Administration had opposed passage of the ACPA
in 1999. See Anne Gallagher, Senate Lawmakers Target Cyberspace, Wash. Tech., Aug. 30,
1999, available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/14_11/federal/754-1.html (last
visited Dec. 31, 2003) (observing that "[w]hile cybersquatting bills might be making their way
through Congress with ease, the Clinton administration is not all that pleased. It is opposed to
becoming a referee for domain names and wants disputes settled in the courts instead.").
92. See, e.g., Andrew D. Murray, Entering into Contracts Electronically: The Real W.W.W.
(concluding that a "digital document" would have failed to meet document requirements under
United Kingdom law in the late 1990s), in LAW AND THE INTERNET: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 17, 19-20 (Lilian Edwards et. al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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The solutions most likely not to be wrong are those that are minimal,
general solutions to the uncertainty. The obvious answer is the adoption
of "equivalence" rules,93 i.e., that, under certain conditions, electronic
files, electronic "signatures," electronic delivery, etc., are legally
sanctioned as equivalents to their meatspace counterparts. This can be
achieved by statutory provisions on "legal effect" that are increasingly
common. For example, the EU's 2000 E-Commerce Directive
establishes among European countries an obligation to allow "contracts
to be concluded by electronic means"-an obligation that is achieved by
prohibiting any "legal requirements applicable to the contractual
process" that would "result in such contracts being deprived of legal
effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by
electronic means." 94
Similarly, the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act ("UETA") in the
United States provides that "[a] record or signature may not be denied
legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form. ' 95
Pakistan's new law on e-commerce succinctly states that "the
requirement under any law for affixation of signatures shall be deemed
satisfied where electronic signatures ... are applied, ' 96 while Philippine
law now provides that:
Electronic documents shall have the legal effect, validity or
enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and
... Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if the said electronic
93. Id. at 20. As early as 1996, UNCITRAL advocated such a "functional equivalence"
approach. See UNCITRAL, GUIDE TO ENACTMENT OF UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE paras.15-16 (1996) (explaining "functional equivalent approach"),
available at www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
94. Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information
Society Services, in Particular, Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 9, § 1, 2000 O.J.
(L 178) 11 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000l1 78/117820000717en00010016.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
95. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTION ACT § 7(a) (1999). As of December 2003, forty-four states
and the District of Columbia had adopted the UETA. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS (NCCUSL), A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC
TRANSACTION ACT, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_ factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
ueta.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2003); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.7(a) (West Supp. 2003).
Section 1633.7(b) similarly provides that "[a] contract may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation." Id. § 1633.7(b).
96. The Pakistani Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002 was promulgated on September 11,
2002. Electronic Transactions Ordinance Promulgated, DAWN, Sept. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.dawn.com/2002/09/12/topl5.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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document maintains its integrity and reliability and can be
authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference .... 97
The Philippine law further provides conditions under which "[a]n
electronic signature on the electronic document shall be equivalent to
the signature of a person on a written document" 98 and under which
"[w]here the law requires information to be presented or retained in its
original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or
electronic document.
99
Many of these equivalence laws bear some relationship to the
UNCITRAL model law and, to that degree, could also be placed within
the "soft law" model law narrative. 100 I put e-contracting equivalence
convergence here because of an admittedly unproven belief that this
type of convergence would have occurred at roughly the same pace with
or without the UNCITRAL model. Perhaps a "purer" example of
invisible hand convergence are limitations on ISPs' liability for the
actions of their subscribers. The problem of liability of ISPs for actions
by ISP users was one of the earliest legal issues for the Internet. Serious
libel got to the Internet long before serious e-commerce. In addition to
defamation, ISPs quickly confronted liability issues for third party
copyright infringement, trademark infringement, disclosure of trade
secrets, and violations of privacy rights.
Once it was accepted that ISPs do not themselves "communicate"
content to the public,' 0 ' there were a variety of ways to conceptualize
ISP exposure to third party liability for what Internet users send through
the system. At one extreme, ISPs could be held to the strict liability
97. Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Republic Act No. 8792, § 7 (Phil.), available at
http://www.pinoylaw.com/e-commerce.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
98. Id. § 8. See also § 5(e), which states that:
"Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in
electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically
associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any
methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted
by such person with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data
message or electronic document.
99. Id. § 10(1).
100. They bear "some relationship" because it is difficult to tell how much each country was
influenced by the UNCITRAL model or whether the UNCITRAL model provides some political
justification to modify laws in the direction that the European Union and the United States have
moved.
101. See Agreed Statement Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, available
at http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/96dc.htm#a_8 (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) ("It is
understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication
does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne
Convention."); see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Caching and Copyright: The Right of Temporary
Copying, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 482, 489 (2000).
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standard of a publisher. 10 2  At the other extreme, the ISPs could be
regarded as the equivalent of a telephone company or the postal
service-not responsible for the illegal materials that they carry on
behalf of third persons. Intermediary standards and analogies were also
available.
But market economics do point toward a choice among the
competing standards of liability. With the present state of technology, a
country that imposes strict liability on ISPs for third party defamation
and intellectual property infringement will drive ISPs either (a) out of
business or (b) into highly restricted business models (in order to
contain the otherwise enormous policing costs to keep defamatory
and/or infringing material off their system).10 3
Barring improbable technology developments, 10 4 market forces will
force countries to move toward legal systems that either (a) completely
shield ISPs from such liability or (b) enable ISPs to shield themselves
from most liability through reasonable, affordable self-policing. This is
the result one sees over and over again; so much so that Professor
Michael Geist recently noted, "the rules for ISPs [are] increasingly
settled." 105.
102. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995) (finding strict liability as the publisher of defamatory comments made by an unidentified
party on one of Prodigy's bulletin boards). In the same spirit, the U.S. Department of
Commerce's early analysis of copyright and Internet issues concluded that ISPs should be
analogized to publishers, putting substantial liability on them for third party infringements. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE WHITE PAPER: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 235 (1995). The "White Paper," as it was called, was directed principally by
then Assistant Secretary Bruce Lehman. See also Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., 4 All E.R. 342
(Q.B. 1999) (discussing an ISP as a publisher). The Godfrey case was not a strict liability holding,
as Demon had been put on notice of the defamation. The United States soon moved away from
the Stratton Oakmont approach, as evidenced by limitations on ISP liability in 47 U.S.C. § 230.
See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
103. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that strict liability for ISPs "would chill the use of the Internet
because every access provider or user would be subject to liability when a user posts an infringing
work to a Usenet newsgroup"); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the
Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators,
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 348 (1995) (arguing that imposing liability will restrict the
flow of information).
104. Improbable because all information moving through the Internet is (a) sufficiently fixed
to be eligible for copyright and (b) potentially defamatory. It is hard to see how automated
screening could overcome these law-produced characteristics of Internet "content."
105. Michael Geist, Internet 'Choke Points' Put the Squeeze on Content, TORONTO GLOBE
AND MAIL, July 11, 2002, at B lI, available at http://www.globeandmail.comlservlet/
ArticleNews/printarticle/gam/2002071 I/TWGEIS (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
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An example of the first choice-solid shielding from liability-is the
United States' Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230,
interpreted as addressing the problem of Internet defamation. Section
230 provides that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider."' 10 6 The shield is
complete as long as the provider of "an interactive computer service" is
not responsible "for the creation or development of [the]
information,"107 a provision that has been interpreted generously by
American courts. 108
As to the second approach, the United States, China, Japan, and the
European Union all have laws of some type shielding ISPs from liability
for third party data transfers when the ISP: (a) does not create or control
the third party's content, (b) does not control who gets the content, (c)
does not retain the content any longer than reasonably necessary, and,
critically, (d) does not know about the illegal nature of the content.
Typically, when the ISP does learn of the illegal nature of the data
transfer, the protection from liability is premised on prompt elimination
of the content from the Internet.
This is the general formula in the United States' DMCA, which
establishes ISP "safe harbors" from contributory and vicarious liability
for copyright infringement. 109 It is also the formula embodied in the
EU's 2000 Electronic Commerce Directive concerning liability for third
party defamations and intellectual property infringements.' 1 0 Both the
106. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
107. Id. § 230(0.
108. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 230
immunized "AOL from liability for information that originate[d] with third parties"); Blumenthal
v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 47, 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that § 230(c) shielded AOL from
defamation liability by Matthew Drudge, even where Drudge was paid by AOL to provide
content to AOL users).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
110. See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 94, arts. 12-14; see also Electronic
Communications: The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, arts. 17-19,
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/industry-files/pdf/regulations.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
Among EU members, some had already passed statutes or had court decisions limiting ISP
liability. Luxembourg's Law of 14 August 2000 limits ISP liability to conditions very similar to
the DMCA, but for all bases for liability. See Veronique Hoffeld & Sara Delbecque,
Luxembourg, in ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGULATION Binder I,
at Lux-7 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2003). In a 2000 case, the Italian Supreme Court held that an ISP
would not be held liable for defamation by one of its users absent the requirements of
"conspiracy" in the Italian penal code being met. Francesco Portolano & Eugenio Prosperetti,
Italy (reporting on Corte de Cassazione, Decision No. 1141 of October 27, 2000), in ONLINE
SERVICE PROVIDERS, supra, at ITA-17-19. A December 2002 Law Commission report in the
United Kingdom recommended that, if anything, European law on liability for third party
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DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive have discrete provisions
applying the liability shielding conditions to the three main ISP
functions: transmission, caching, and hosting information materials.
The DMCA also extends its safe harbor concepts to "information
location tools,"' I II a provision intended to protect search engines.
Early Internet defamation cases in Japan followed the same general
trend," l2 and, more recently, Japan has adopted similar statutory
standards to shield ISPs from third party copyright infringements.
1 1 3
India, however, shows only a limited movement in this direction to date.
India's Information Technology Act of 2000 provides some shelter for
ISPs based on a combined knowledge and diligence standard-
protecting a person from liability "for any third party information or
data made available by him if he proves that the offence or
contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or
contravention."' 1 14 It is unclear whether this covers only transmission
services or also extends to hosting. 115 With no case law to date
defamations should be moved closer to the United States' § 230 standard, further protecting ISPs.
See Owen Gibson, Report Backs ISP Libel Law Claims, THE GUARDIAN,
http://media.guardian.co.uk/newmedia/story/O,7496,862226,00.html (Dec. 18, 2002).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (d).
112. Interim Report by the Copyright Council of Japan, [First Sub-Committee--Experts'
Working Group], Regarding the Issue of ISP Liability (Dec. 2000) (reporting on 1997 and 1999
Tokyo District Court cases) (unofficial translation on file with author).
113. See Japan: New Law on ISP Liability, INTERNATIONAL IT AND NEW MEDIA UPDATE
(Freschfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London, U.K.), Spring 2002, at 4 (noting that under the new
Provider Liability Law, ISPs in Japan are held liable for infringing material if "[1] it is technically
possible to prevent transmission of the material; and [2] the provider knows of the existence of
the material and (i) knows that it is infringing; or (ii) it is reasonably possible to know that it
infringes"), available at http://www.freshfields.com/practice/ipit/publications/newsletters/ip-
update/2855.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2003); see also Experts Working Group, First Sub-
Committee, Copyright Council of Japan, Interim Report (On Recourse and Punishment) (Dec.
2000) (recommending that Japanese copyright law adopt similar standards for ISP liability as
those used in defamation law, which were similar to the DMCA's approach).
114. Information Technology Act 2000, ch. 12, art. 79 (India), available at
http://www.stpi.soft.net/itbill2000_12.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). Article 79 is captioned
Network Service Providers Not to Liable in Certain Cases. It provides:
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no person providing any service as
a network service provider shall be liable under this Act, rules or regulations made
thereunder for any third party information or data made available by him if he proves
that the offence or contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or contravention.
Id.
115. The statutory language "third party information made available" could suggest either
transmission or hosting (or caching, for that matter). Id. Article 79 further defines "third party
information" as "any information dealt with by a network service provider in his capacity as an
intermediary," which does not help clarify the ambiguity. Id.
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interpreting this provision, it appears to move India some, but only
some, steps toward the convergent standards for ISP liability described
here.
D. Helping Hand Convergence: Viewing "Market "-based Emergence
as the Result of Well-orchestrated Lobbying
It would be remiss to omit an alternative narrative to all of the above:
that various areas of convergence are actually the result of well-
orchestrated lobbying by transnational private actors. In this story,
large corporations and trade associations with a presence in multiple
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
countries lobby in a coordinated manner. They find the friendliest
government to their particular cause and achieve the desired legislative
change there; then they move onto other OECD (and developing)
countries, arguing that to remain "competitive" these other countries
must also adopt the legislative reform in question.
There is nothing inherently sinister about this process-in fact, it is
exactly what one would expect rational actors that cross national
boundaries to do. And this account of convergence is not necessarily
incompatible with each of the others. Take the example discussed
immediately above: convergence toward norms shielding ISPs from
liability for information transfers by ISP users. What can be explained
as market forces may also be explained as AOL and other Internet
companies forging common ground and lobbying in coordination with
national and regional ISPs, all of whom would benefit from liability-
limiting legislation. To the degree this actually happened, it does not
undermine the model of invisible hand, market forces convergence. It
only explains the instrumentality-in the same way a series of gory
battles between competing species might be the instrumentality for
what, at a greater distance, looks like inevitable evolution.
To return to the example of the 1996 WIPO copyright treaties, the
treaties require signatories to provide "effective legal remedies against
the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by
authors" in the exercise of their copyright rights. 116 In other words,
there are effective legal remedies against "digital lock picks" that can be
used to disrupt or circumvent encryption, scrambling, watermarks, and
passwords used by copyright owners to protect their works.
116. WCT, supra note 59, art. 11; see also WPPT, supra note 59, art. 18.
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This new legal standard has been the subject of tremendous debate-
from the theoretical question of whether it is a copyright legal norm 117
to the practical-indeed, critical-problem of interpreting the
ambiguous phrase "effective legal remedies against circumvention."' 118
Does that require prohibiting the act of circumvention (only)? Or does
it require prohibiting circumvention devices, such as illicit
descramblers, password breakers, etc.? Or must a country provide
both? Must a country provide criminal sanctions against circumvention
in order for the legal remedies to be effective?
Interpreting the ambiguous legal norm in article 11 of the WCT
predictably became an area of intense jockeying by interested parties, as
dominant national implementation of the WCT/WPPT provision would
provide substance to what was expressed in the treaties as a very
general standard.1 19
E. Enduring Divergence in Legal Norms
Like evolution-or erosion-convergence is a continuing process, so
that even in areas described above as being subject to Internet-triggered
convergence, there may remain enormous diversity. For example, while
the UDRP approach to cybersquatting is having powerful, convergent
influence, several economies with substantial Internet presences have
yet to settle on a jurisprudence to balance the interests of domain-name
and trademark holders. 120
In contrast to the four narratives above, there are some areas of law
where the most appropriate description is non-convergence; divergence
in the dominant norms in national legal systems will endure. The most
visible of these is the law of free expression. The shielding of ISPs
from liability to other private actors stands in marked contrast to
attitudes toward making ISPs liable to follow the commands of the
117. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER ET AL., NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.18[A] (2003)
(discussing the effects of the WIPO copyright treaties).
118. WCT, supra note 59, art. 11.
119. And properly so, not just for practical reasons (there is no dispute settlement mechanism
for the WCT as there is for TRIPS), but because the content of international legal norms can
depend on their interpretation and implementation by nation-states. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691
(stating that in interpreting a treaty, account shall be taken of "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreements of the parties regarding its
interpretation"), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treatfra.htm (last visited Oct. 7,
2003).
120. France and Australia are two examples. See Buchanan Group Pty. Ltd. v. Sorgetti [2002]
F.C.A. 1646 (Fed. Ct. Austl.) (issuing injunction against domain name on behalf of trademark
holder, but recognizing that legal issues remained unsettled), available at 2002 Aust FEDCT
LEXIS 850.
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public authorities on what materials will and will not flow through the
Internet.
There is no better poster child for the disparate views of free
expression in the Internet than the LICRA v. Yahoo! dispute. 121
Confronted with Nazi paraphernalia being visible in France through
Yahoo! auction pages, a Paris court in 2001 found that it had
jurisdiction to order both Yahoo!'s French operation and Yahoo! in the
United States to take technological measures to stop Internet users on
French territory from receiving these visual images of Nazi
paraphernalia over the Internet. The French court subjected the
companies to hefty fines for any failure to comply. 122 Less than a year
later, a U.S. district court granted Yahoo! (U.S.) summary judgment, on
First Amendment grounds, against any possible enforcement of the
Paris court's ruling. 123
European (and Canadian) laws on "hate" speech 24 are not only
substantively antithetical to our notion of free speech but also would
probably fall before our First Amendment jurisprudence on grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth. Thus, the disagreement between the United
States and other western countries runs deep. Courts on both sides have
been clear: their principles on free or limited expression flow into the
Internet, 125 despite tomes and e-tomes having said that cyberspace is a
different place.
121. League Against Racism & Antisemitism v. Yahoo, Interim Order, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20,
2000, No. RG 00/05308, available at http://www.cdt.org//speech/international/
001 120yahoofrance.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
122. Id.
123. Yahoo! Inc. v. Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D.
Cal. 2001).
124. See, e.g., J'Accuse v. General Communications, T.G.I. Paris, Oct. 30, 2001, No. RG
01/57676 [hereinafter J'Accuse] (finding that the contents of "Front 14" web site hosted by
SKYNETWEB in the United States violated French hate speech law), available at http://
www.foruminternet.org/telechargement/documents/tgi-par200ll030.pdf (last visted Nov. 15,
2003); Associated Press, Rare Case Has Norwegian Man Convicted of Racism on the Web (Apr.
24, 2002) (describing a Norwegian conviction for racist speech and a March 7, 2002, judgment in
Sweden against a tabloid that allowed racist comments on its Internet chat site), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZ2CYYEEOD (last visited Nov.
15, 2003); BBC News, German Faces Jail for 'Ironic' Remark, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2636211.stm (Jan. 7, 2003) (describing German accused of
"glorification of a criminal act" who made a posting "congratulat[ing] ... the murderers of
11.09.01"); see also Schnell v. Machiavelli & Assoc. Emprize Inc., File No. T594/5200 (Can.
Human Rights Tribunal, Aug. 20, 2002) (finding that web pages would likely expose gay and
lesbian persons to hatred and contempt in contravention of Canadian law), available at
http://www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/search/files/t595-5300de.pdf. (last visited Nov. 3, 2003)
125. On the United States side, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), established the broad
principle that the First Amendment is at least as strong in cyberspace as in the physical world.
Courts have followed this up by applying a wide range of free expression-related principles,
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Western hate speech laws-both present and proposed126-are
meager impairments of free expression compared to the law in countries
like China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Zimbabwe. Saudi Arabia, China,
and Singapore are the best known examples of countries that deploy
firewalls and other blocking technology 27 of varying degrees of
seriousness in order to keep out undesirable thoughts. 128 China has
recently succeeded in imposing tough regulations on cybercafes and
"self-regulation" on ISPs-a move that at least one French judge seems
to eye longingly. 129  China and Zimbabwe have both shown a
willingness to move more directly against individual Internet speakers
doctrines, and laws to the Internet. See, e.g., Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 385 (Ga. 2002)
(applying Georgia's libel retraction statute to shield Internet publisher from punitive damages).
126. For example, presently before the European Union, there is a "Proposal for a Council
Framework Decision on Combating Racism," which would require EU countries to move toward
"approximation of laws and regulations.. . involving racism and xenophobia." Commission of
the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combatting Racism
and Xenophobia, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2001/com2001_0664en01.pdf (Nov.
28, 2001). Article 4(a) prohibits both "public incitement to ... hatred for a racist or xenophobic
purpose or to any other racist or xenophobic behaviour which may cause substantial damage to
individuals or groups concerned," while 4(b) prohibits "public insults.., for a racist or
xenophobic purpose." Id. art. 4(a)-(b). The article 3 definition of racism or xenophobia is quite
broad. See id. art. 3. The European Commission recently proposed a "law to ban sexist
television programmes and advertising" which has created an uproar among media companies.
See George Parker & Tim Burt, EU Push for Law Against Sexism Draws Fire, FIN. TIMES, June
25, 2003, at A2 (discussing reaction to the proposed law), available at 2003 WL 57314256.
127. The 2002 Chinese crackdown on cybercafes has included the installation of software that
records attempts by caf6 users to access banned sites. See Erik Eckholm, Taboo Surfing: Click
Here for Iran and Here for China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, § 4, at 5 (describing China's
policing of Internet content), available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File;
Agence France-Presse, China Announces 'Self-Discipline' Scheme for Internet Providers (July 5,
2002) (announcing China Internet Association's self-imposed ban on producing harmful content),
available at 2002 WL 23551634.
128. For a very good discussion of the variety and seriousness of technology used by different
countries, see Taylor C. Boas, Weaving the Authoritarian Web: The Control of Internet Use in
Non-Democratic Regimes (2003) (unpublished manuscript presented at China & the Internet:
Technology, Economy, and Society in Transition, Conference at University of Southern
California, May 30-31, 2003) (on file with author). For an in-depth look at technology used by
Chinese authorities, see MICHAEL CHASE & JAMES MULVENON, YOU'VE GOT DISSENT:
CHINESE DISSIDENT USE OF THE INTERNET AND BEIJING'S COUNTER-STRATEGIES (2002).
129. In the October 2001 J'Accuse decision, the Paris court declined to hold French ISPs
responsible for a hate-speech site hosted in the United States and accessible in France, but noted
that "it will not be possible to delay the debate on a more active participation by all Internet
participants, .. . including access providers." J'Accuse, supra note 124 [[Q]u'il ne sera pas
possible de diff6rer longtemps encore le d6bat sur une participation plus dynamique de
l'ensemble des acteurs d'internet... en ceux compris les foumisseurs d'accs.]. Judge Gomez's
remarks come despite a 1996 ruling from the French Constitutional Court holding an earlier law
on ISP liability unconsitutional on structural grounds, but with some emphasis on free expression
concerns. See Cons. const., July 23, 1996, No. 96-378, Recueil 99, J.O., July 27, 1996, p. 11400;
JCP 1996, I, 675, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1996/96378dc.htm
(last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
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or users when they deem the messages at issue sufficiently dangerous or
destabilizing. In 2002, Li Dawei, a forty-year-old former policeman,
became the first individual Chinese citizen sentenced to prison for
downloading from the Internet materials deemed politically
unacceptable. 130 Vietnam recently followed suit, sentencing a dissident
to thirteen years of prison for posting articles on democracy.131
Prospects for convergence in this realm seem qualitatively dimmer
than in areas of law described above (and many others). "Regime
change" in China-legal regime change, at least-would be the single
biggest factor in whether any convergence here is possible. On a more
jurisprudential plane, there will be some key elements to watch. For
example, European laws may move closer or further away from
American notions of free expression as the jurisprudence of the
European Convention on Human Rights is filled out more fully. 132 On
the other hand, the United States views of free expression could become
an increasingly isolated position if multilateral agreements against hate
crimes or denials of genocide, like elements of the Convention on
Cybercrime, gain more traction. 133
It should be remembered that non-convergence need not be limited to
issues where there are heartfelt, deeply-embedded national differences.
Non-convergence can remain the state of affairs when established
national differences cause only tolerable losses in efficiency. Indeed, in
such situations the main forces for convergence will probably be
bureaucrats, diplomats, and lobbyists looking for something to do.
Where the costs of diverse norms to transnational business are minimal,
it may be irrational for corporate interests to press for convergence.
130. Reuters, China Jails Politically Incorrect Net User 11 Years (Aug. 5, 2002), available at
http://in.tech.yahoo.com/020805/64/lt8eh.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2003).
131. Vietnamese 'Cyber-Dissident' Jailed, AUSTRALIAN IT, at http://australianit.
news.com.au/articles/0,7204,6620154%5E 15330%5E%5Enbv%5E 15306-15319,00.html (June
19, 2003); see also Geoffrey Robertson, Mugabe Versus the Internet, THE GUARDIAN, June 17,
2002, at 18 (describing trial of a Guardian journalist for a crime of "abusing journalistic
privilege" with an Internet article), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/
0,3604,738813,00.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
132. See, e.g., Lehindeux & Isinori v. France, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 665 (2000) (concluding that
French law against Nazi and collaborator justification was an abridgement of the free expression
guaranteed in European Convention on Human Rights), available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/
sim/caselaw/hof.nsf/(title)?openview (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
133. See Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the
Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer
Systems, opened for signature Jan. 28, 2003, Council of Europe, ETS No. 189 (barring material
from the Internet that "denies, grossly minimises, approves, or justifies acts constituting genocide
or crimes against humanity"), available at http://conventions.coe.intITreaty/EN/Treaties/
Html189.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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Let me give an example of what may be, from one perspective, non-
convergence and, from another perspective, arguably market forces
convergence: legal protection of large, comprehensive databases. The
problem of protecting the investment in large, comprehensive databases
arose from court decisions in the United States and Europe in the early
1990s that appeared to denude these databases of copyright
protection. 134 In response, the European Union promulgated a directive
in 1996 establishing a strong intellectual property right specific to
databases (the "Database Directive").' 35 The EU put the issue on the
negotiating table for the WIPO Diplomatic Conference to be held in
December 1996, and the United States initially signaled its willingness
to accept something along the Directive's model, presumably in
exchange for EU concessions in other areas. 136 But in the months that
followed, awareness of and opposition to the Database Directive grew
among scientists, researchers, and educators in the United States. 137
The result was that database protection had to be taken off the agenda of
the 1996 diplomatic conference. 138 In other words, an early attempt at
"top-down" convergence failed.
The court decisions in the United States, Belgium, France, and the
Netherlands curtailing copyright protection of databases had come just
as a new period of production and networked distribution of massive
databases was dawning-it would still be five years before the word
"Internet" appeared in a United States Supreme Court case (1996). 139
So, one might have expected quick convergence or re-convergence
toward norms of protection. Yet after a brief flirtation in 1998, database
134. For an exhaustive account, see Justin Hughes, Political Economies of Harmonization:
Database Protection and Information Patents (July 8, 2002) (paper presented at the Institut
Franqais des Relations Internationales) [hereinafter Hughes, Political Economies], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=318486 (last visited Oct. 8, 2003). The cases
in question were Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Corp., 499 U.S. 340 (1991),
and Van RommelVan Dale Lexicograpfie, HR 4 januari 1991 (Neth.), translated in PROTECTING
WORKS OF FACT 93 (Egbert J. Dommering & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 1991). Beginning in
1989, French courts also delivered a series of decisions denying copyright protection to factual
compilations on the grounds that they did not reach "au rang de crdation intellectuelle" or
constitute an "apport crfatif et intellectuel." See LUCAS, supra note 42, at 40 n.79.
135. Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996
O.J. (L 77), available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/969ec.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2003).
136. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR DATABASES 50-51
(1997), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2003) (noting brief
discussions of the European proposal for database protection occurring during meetings in
February, May, and August of 1996).
137. Id. at 54-55.
138. Id. at55.
139. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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protection legislation has floundered in the U.S. Congress. 140 There are
many reasons for this, including the well-orchestrated opposition of
academics and key Internet companies AOL, Yahoo!, and AT&T.
Meanwhile, opposition among developing countries seems to have
grown politically attached to a belief that the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") Agreement and the WIPO
structures are already biased in favor of wealthy nations. 141
If the United States does not adopt new legal norms for extra-
copyright protection of databases, it can be considered an example of
abiding, enduring non-convergence. But what makes this abiding non-
convergence bearable? If such protection is really needed-as the
European Commission claimed-for appropriate levels of investment in
large, comprehensive databases, then U.S. information industries
should, ceteris paribus, fall behind. There is no indication of that as
yet. In a 2001 study, Maurer, Hugenholtz, and Onsrud concluded that
commercial database production in Europe rose sharply following the
1996 Directive, but then fell off again, so that any post-Directive growth
in Europe's database industry has been minimal. 142 But in my view, it
140. For details, see generally Hughes, Political Economies, supra note 134; Hughes, Extra-
Copyright Protection, supra note 38, at 167-70, 194-95 (describing bills before Congress in 1998
and 1999).
141. For example, a WIPO-organized Asian regional meeting on database protection officially
reported, "consensus that the need for additional protection whether at the national, regional, or
international level had not been established at this point. A variety of concerns were raised
including those related to scientific and educational fields and as to whether protection should
extend to data in the public domain." WIPO, Statement Adopted at the Regional Roundtable for
Countries of Asia and the Pacific on the Protection of Databases and on the Potection of the
Rights of Broadcasting Organizations, WIPO Doc. SCCR/3/6, at 3, para 9 (Aug. 30, 1999),
available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/l1999/sccr_99/sccr3_6.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2003). Representatives at the parallel WIPO meeting in Africa similarly "expressed their concern
about the possible impact of a new legal protection ... on access to information in the fields of
education, science, and research in African countries." WIPO, Report of the Regional
Roundtable for African Countries on the Protection of Databases and on the Protection of the
Rights of Broadcasting Organizations, WIPO Doc. SCCR/3/2, at 2, para. 5 (July 30, 1999),
available at http://www.wipo.org/eng/meetings/l1999/sccr_99/sccr3_2.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2003); see also PHILIP KUBLER, RECHTSSCHUTZ VON DATENBANKEN (EU-USA-SCHWEIZ) 316
(1999) (listing the United States, Singapore, Senegal, India, Honduras, Ghana, China, Benin, and
Belarus as opposed to database protection or insistent on exceptions).
142. Stephen M. Maurer, P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Harlan J. Onsrud, Europe's Database
Experiment, 294 SCIENCE 789 (Oct. 26, 2001). The Science article builds on a larger study
presented by Maurer at an Industry Canada conference in 2001. See Stephen M. Maurer, Across
Two Worlds: Database Protection in the U.S. and Europe 6 (2001) (unpublished manuscript for
Canada's Conference on Intellectual Property and Innovation in a Knowledge-based Economy,
May 23-24, 2001) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Maurer, Across Two Worlds].
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would be irrational to expect any meaningful incentive effects from the
Database Directive as yet. 143
Even if the Database Directive is a positive instrument in Europe for
prompting long-term investment in information products, the trans-
Atlantic difference in law may be tolerable for another reason: the
"legal market" has already "reconverged," producing similar levels of
protection in different legal clothing. While American courts have
generally enforced the Supreme Court's conclusion that copyright no
longer protects large, comprehensive databases, U.S. database owners
more often than not emerge victorious through contract law, 144 state law
misappropriation, violation of federal laws protecting information on
networked computers, and an old common-law cause of action: trespass
to chattels.
The last of these is the most interesting. Since 2000, the trespass to
chattels cause of action has emerged, new and mutant, as a powerful
device to protect online databases from unauthorized data "scrapers"
and aggregators. 145 Without judging the wisdom of this wave of
trespass to chattel cases, 146 a quirky kind of parallelism seems to be
present. Back in the early 1990s, the experts and bureaucrats working
the Database Directive were concerned about electronic databases as
being the most vulnerable to misappropriation; from 2000 onward
American courts morph an old common-law cause of action to protect
electronic, online databases from what amounts to unauthorized
appropriation.
143. If the Directive only repackages the levels of copyright protection and/or catalog rule
protection offered in Britain, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, then there is no reason to
expect any impact ever in those countries. Moreover, for example, the Directive was not
implemented in Italy until 1998 (Law Number 128 of April 24, 1998) and not in Luxembourg
until 2001 (Law of April 18, 2001, Mimorial A, No. 50). It would be an amazingly optimistic
model of business decision-making that predicts an intellectual property law will be understood
by business people and affect their investment decisions before it is implemented.
144. The leading contract law case is, of course, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996).
145. Leading trespass to chattels cases include Am. Airlines v. Farechase, Inc., No. 067-
194022-02 (D.C. Tex. Mar. 8, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/Cases/AAvFarechase/
20030310_prelim inj.pdf; Register.com, Inc. v. Verio Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); and Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000),
amended by No. CV 99-7654, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
146. For critical analysis of this new version of an old cause of action, see Dan L. Burk, The
Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000); Maureen O'Rourke,
Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1965, 1994-97 (2000); see also David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent,
35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 360-66 (2003) (raising additional complexities as to why the trespass cause
of action should arguably be modified for these chattels).
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So perhaps extra-copyright protection of databases is an area where,
formally speaking, there is stabilized non-convergence and, practically
speaking, there has been some stealth re-convergence, different legal
systems finding different ways to produce protection of the investment
in databases. The remaining differences in legal coverage may be
sufficiently tolerable to the parties involved that no one ramps up
massive lobbying for change.
In some cases, the tolerability of legal divergence in an increasingly
global, networked economy will partly depend on technological
developments. Consider the imposition of local sales tax on Internet
transactions. Taxing Internet transactions and remitting the funds to
state, municipal, and local authorities will be possible when we have
some combination of (a) local sales taxes being harmonized or
standardized, and (b) database technology that permits vendors (or their
intermediaries) to impose differing tax rates easily. Complete
resolution of (b) would allow continued divergence in tax rates;
complete harmonization (as unlikely as that is) would obviate the need
for technological improvements.
The point is that there has been, perhaps, a tendency to overestimate
the harmonizing effects of globalization on meatspace practices, 147 and
we should avoid that same mistake when pondering the fate of law on
the Internet.
IV. OF PROFESSORS AND PROPHETS
One of the remarkable things about the period from conclusion of the
TRIPS Agreement until now has been the tremendous policy activism
of academics in the overlapping fields of intellectual property and
"Internet law." This has principally been from legal academics, but has
also included the scientific research community. Such policy activism
is not unique. We thankfully have had such professorial activism in a
wide range of areas, whether it be environmental protection in the late
twentieth century or abolition of slavery in the early and mid-nineteenth
century.
When a professor becomes such an activist, she typically abandons,
to some degree, her role of observing a problem. In policy advocacy,
the professor typically starts making very public predictions of what
will happen with or without the proposed legislation, issuing dire
warnings on what will happen if we do not cut greenhouse gas
147. See generally MAURO F. GUiLLtN, THE LIMITS OF CONVERGENCE: GLOBALIZATION
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN ARGENTINA, SouTH KOREA, AND SPAIN (2001) (describing
how business practices in Argentina, South Korea, and Spain are not converging).
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emissions, or fail to curb the violence in video games, or cluelessly
permit publishers to impose unreasonable contractual terms on the use
of information products.
It is important to recognize such predictive activities for what they
are. We seem to be past the time of magic and miracles; what we once
would have judged to be possession and witchcraft, we now diagnose as
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder and other psychoses. 148  But public
prophecy is still with us. It comes from pundits, politicians, and think
tanks; sometimes it comes from professors.
Perhaps a few scholars make public pronouncements about the future
for the pleasure of being (publicly) right, but many are aiming to
produce self-defeating prophesies. This is hardly a new technique; it is
part of what made oracles interesting. Around 547 BC, the Oracle of
Delphi told Croesus, King of Lydia, that if he crossed a river, a great
kingdom would fall. The kingdom turned out to be his own, not the
Persians on the other side of the river Halys. But if properly interpreted,
the Oracle's prophecy would have been self-defeating. By all accounts,
Croesus did not cross the river to commit auto-regicide. Professorial
predictions of the future, like oracle prophesies, offer the prospect of
changing the future by predicting it. The prophesy is typically intended
to cajole us to avert the danger that the academic sees on the horizon.
Some will reject out of hand a comparison between ancient prophets
and modem day professors. But the comparison should not be
dismissed because of our stylized, if not cartoonish, understanding of
the ancient prophet. The recent work of my colleague Suzanne Last
Stone explores the richness and complexity of prophecy in the rabbinic
tradition. 149 While the unifying and "crucial feature of prophecy" in
these Talmudic stories "is a special privileged access to God,"'150
Professor Stone explores how the stories raise difficult questions about
the role of human agency and judgment in relation to divine
message--issues that have a striking similarity to aspects of evidence
law, constitutional law, and, for my mind, copyright.
For example, Professor Stone explores the story of the 400 prophets
who, called before Kings Ahab and Jehosaphat, "prophesy in unison
148. Michael Singer, Six Illnesses Stumbling Toward a Cure, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2003,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 30-31 (describing how Obsessive-Compulsive Syndrome was originally
treated as the "Devil's work"), available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
149. Suzanne Last Stone, Prophecy, Trust, and Authority (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) [hereinafter Stone, Prophesy, Trust, and Authority]. For an earlier version of her
vision of the relationship between revelation and human cognition/decision-making, see Suzanne
Last Stone, Tolerance Versus Pluralism in Judaism, 2 J. HUM. RTS. 105, 112 (2003).
150. Stone, Prophesy, Trust, and Authority, supra note 149, at 1.
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success in battle." 151  This prophetic chorus is false because true
prophetic speech conveys the mediation of the individual human
prophet. The parallels to collusive testimony are obvious: we expect
that human agency and cognition will intervene between receipt of the
sensory (or spiritual) impressions and communication of the story to us.
When all the stories sound much alike, we are reassured. When all the
stories sound exactly alike, we are concerned that something is amiss.
Authenticity requires "[o]riginality of thought and expression."' 152
Professor Stone describes a variety of false prophets found in the
scriptures, including "people who offer accommodating oracles to those
who solicit them and are paid for their services"-an apt description of
many of the "reports" and dossiers produced by Washington lobbyists-
and "people who do no more than simply use their imagination."']53 In
Jeremiah, false prophets are described as "those who mistake their
imagination for a divine message" and "even Jeremiah was not sure at
times whether this or a competing prophet's message was true or
false."' 154  Stone emphasizes the responsibility that emerges: "[T]he
prophet himself, who may be seduced by a lying spirit or gripped by his
imagination, must choose whether to utter his prophecy or suppress
it." 155
It is against this kind of understanding of ancient prophecy that we
should consider the responsibility of modern day visionaries-people
given the education, the time, and the luxury of disengagement from
daily struggles to envision the future. Modern scholarship in the social
sciences, economics, law, and the physical sciences has always been a
kind of predictive activity-how materials will react under physical
conditions; how the courts will handle a new and strange legal issue;
151. Id. at 13.
152. Id. at 19 ("Originality of thought and expression, a critical moral voice, and iconoclasm
thus become the outstanding features of the true classical prophets, a conception of prophecy
familiar in Western political thought."); see also id. at 22 ("[A]n indentifying mark or divine
insignia of a true prophetic message is the individual variation in the prophet's speech ....
Individual speech is a mark of genuine divine-human partnership."). For any intellectual property
professor or practitioner, the connection to copyright doctrine should be evident: many people
may share the same idea just as many prophets may share the same vision, but originality of
expression is the benchmark for a protectable copyright interest. In contrast, too much similarity
in expression betrays a copyist, with no protectable interests and subject to liability. See, e.g., Ty,
Inc. v. GMA Accessories Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that "a similarity
that is so close as to be highly unlikely to have been an accident of independent creation is
evidence of access"); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988); Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
153. Stone, Phrophecy, Trust, and Authority, supra note 149, at 4-5.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id. at 6.
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how the economy will perform under certain assumptions; what we
should see if a particular quantum theory holds; how rational actors will
behave under certain conditions-whether a psychologists' game, a
game theorist's game, or a change in the tax laws. But there are two
important aspects of this predictive activity.
First, these predictions-filling academic journals and conference
proceedings-are almost always cautious, very tentative, and highly
detailed in the conditions and limitations from which future events are
extrapolated. Some are cynical about this aspect of scholarship: results
are tentative because no one provides further funding for conclusive
research. But to me this is integral to the "liberal outlook" and the
mission of academia. The liberal outlook begins with-and
emphasizes-what Bertrand Russell called the "virtue" of "suspended
judgment." 156 And even when judgments are made, "[t]he essence of
the liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held, but in how they are
held: instead of being held dogmatically, they are held tentatively, and
with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to
their abandonment." 157
Second, these predictions are made in a relatively small world. Not
quite private, but definitely not front-page "public." For better or for
worse, academic discourse is largely scholars talking among
themselves. One of the "better" aspects of this is that peer
understanding of the process means a certain, greater freedom of
thought and comment. The circle of scholars that considers one's
proposals and predictions understands that they are tentative, that they
are meant to sketch, to outline, to suggest, and to try out ideas about the
future. 158
Taking the stage-or being forced upon the stage-for public
prophecy seems a bit different. My concern here is not the same as in
the recent debates over legal scholars participating in the public
discourse about President Clinton's impeachment 59 or the Bush v. Gore
156. BERTRAND RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 27 (1950) ("To endure uncertainty is
difficult, but so are most of the other virtues. For the learning of every virtue there is
[a] ... discipline, and for the [virtue] of suspended judgement the ... discipline is philosophy.").
157. Id. at 15.
158. For an example of an academic's tentative ideas getting into the press, causing a stir, and
then turning out to be wrong, see Daniel Altman, It Looked Good on Paper, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2003, §3, at 1 (describing economist Michael J. Boskin's calculations of a $12 trillion dollar
unaccounted surplus but "after his ideas were discussed on TV, he quietly notified his colleagues
that his equations contained an error"), available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times
File.
159. E.g., Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of
Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (1999); Stephen M. Griffin, An Exchange of Views:
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case. 160 Those debates largely concerned whether the law professors
were qualified to offer public opinion on the constitutional issues
involved. In contrast, almost all the legal scholars involved in the
intellectual property debates of the past decade have been magnificently
qualified as thinkers in intellectual property. My concern is the nature
of effective public prophecy and advocacy-and how that nature relates
to the role of the professor. I have no claim about the "correct"
relationship between the two, only a belief that we in "Internet law" and
intellectual property should ponder the issue more.
These days, being a public prophet is less risky than it used to be-
from a bodily harm point of view-but perhaps more risky from the
point of view of credibility. The nice thing about Delphic prophecies' 6'
was that they could come true one way or another: "cross that border
river with your army and one kingdom or another is going to lose big
time." But such vague prophesies don't mesh well with our sound bite
system of popular communications. Perhaps it's not a question of
size-Chinese fortune cookies can pack a lot of ambiguity into a sound
bite. But it does seem to be a question of the market for attention. It is
hard to be colorful without a clear position. Certainty sells, as does
drama.
This market for certainty and drama means that even before we get to
prophesies that are intended to fail by rallying people for change,
reported modern prophets may tend to have bad batting averages. Thus,
in 1996, beloved eternal computer wunderkind Steve Jobs said, "I don't
see most people using the Web to get more information. We're already
in information overload," 162 while just a couple years earlier, science
fiction visionary Michael Crichton prophesized, "What we now
understand as the mass media will be gone within ten years. Vanished,
without a trace." 163
Standards for Academics Advising Courts and Legislatures: Scholars and Public Debates: A
Reply to Devins and Farnsworth, 82 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2002); Neal Devins & John McGinnis,
Sign Them Up, LEGAL TIMES, July 24, 2000, at 62.
160. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
161. See, e.g., WILLIAM GOLDING, THE DOUBLE TONGUE (1995) (Nobel prize winner's
enigmatic draft novel about the Oracle of Delphi).
162. Gary Wolf, Steve Jobs: The Next Insanely Great Thing, WIRED, Feb. 1996, reprinted in
WIRED, Apr. 2003, at 131, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.02/jobs.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2003).
163. Michael Crichton, Mediasaurus, WIRED, Sept./Oct. 1993, reprinted in WIRED, Apr.
2003, at 130, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l.04/mediasaurus.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2003). A decade later, the deployment of broadband and the embrace of the
Internet by traditional media companies now seems likely to produce a two-tier Internet: one tier
that is the beloved, decentralized world of e-mail and blogs; and one that is just like mass media,
20031
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And publicly reported prophecies at least have the sobering effect of
social embarrassment when they turn out horribly wrong. The same
cannot be said of the exaggerated claims made by D.C. lobbyists about
how much impact each action by Congress will have. Lobbyists
regularly prophesize virtual catastrophes if their legislation is not
enacted-or their opponents' legislation is. This is as true of
intellectual property lobbyists as any others. And perhaps it is not
wholly their fault. Maybe hyperbole is required these days. In our
entertainment, we're so used to seeing airliners destroyed, downtowns
ripped apart, and whole cities levelled that it hardly seems worthwhile
to send James Bond out for less than the risk of global conflagration.
Averting economic disaster is the least we can expect from a piece of
legislation.
In the case of intellectual property, there has also been a sense that
during the 1990s, prophecy and proselytizing were very one-sided; that
intellectual property owners were loudly prophesizing disaster unless
increasingly strong protection was put in place. But the clamor did not
include consumers and users of intellectual property. In the case of the
scientific community entering the debates about database protection in
the mid-1990s, its involvement was both idealistic and self-interested-
members of the scientific community are database consumers. In the
case of law professors entering the fray over copyright, patent, and
trademark law expansion, the motive seems to have been more purely
idealistic and other-regarding. 164
But in both cases, the need to counter what was seen as one-sided
hyperbole may have contributed to the public commentary of scholars
being less nuanced and less tentative than their statements in more
reflective environments. Thus, the activist professor can be drawn into
a role that is in deep tension with her professorial role. Whether a
biologist or a business school guru, the professor is an individual who
society intentionally secludes from the daily demands of commerce and
custom in order that she might view things from a position of
disinterest, and of some kind of "objectivity." Scholars are supposed to
but through a broadband pipe. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 442-43 (2000).
164. But elsewhere I have raised the question whether law professors are especially concerned
about things like "derivative work" rights because they (subconsciously) recognize that their own
works are so derivative. See Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REv. 923, 958 (1999).
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come from and reflect what Justice Felix Frankfurther called "the
tradition of disinterested inquiry, instead of predetermined results."
165
There is no doubt that this is what people expect of academics. In
early 2003, with a growing on-campus rift over Iraq between more
liberal professors and a more conservative student body, an
undergraduate posed a simple, albeit rhetorical question to his
professors: "There comes a point when you wonder are you fostering a
discussion or are you promoting an opinion you want students to
embrace or even parrot?"'166 Scholars have a traditional social role 167 of
neutrality, which will be affected, good or bad, by the nature of their
activism.
Is this just an old-fashioned, hopelessly un-postmodern view of the
professor and the university? As David Rabban and many others have
noted, many scholars "no longer share the epistemological assumptions"
that underpinned defenses of academic freedom since the early
twentieth century. 168 Instead, we now know that assumptions infect
observations, that statements of fact are themselves value-laden, and
that our personal ideologies color our perspectives 24/7.169 As an
intellectual comments in Andrew Miller's novel Oxygen, "We take on a
certain view when we are young then spend the rest of our lives
165. FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Profession of Law, in OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS
THAT MATTER 146, 155 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965).
166. Kate Zernike, With Current War, Professors Protest as Students Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2003, at Al (quoting Jack Morgan, a sophomore at Amherst College), available at
LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
167. Adverse public reaction to advocacy or overly strong advocacy by actors and musicians
may tell us a great deal about expected "roles." For example, our musicians are expected to make
social and political commentary in their music; we treat them very much as modem poets. But
sometimes they cross invisible lines and become targets of criticism for the same behavior. In
2003, the musical message in Madonna's album American Life was blasted as being too much
sanctimonious preaching. See, e.g., Greg Kot, Madonna, Don't Preach-You're Still Material
Girl, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 2003, §7, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library, Chicago Tribune
File. While, at the same time, one of the Dixie Chicks' extra-musical statements criticizing
President Bush brought death threats and sales boycotts upon her group. One cartoon of the
period portrayed American troops talking to Iraqis with the first saying, "See, this is democracy.
You're now free to criticize your leaders," and the second soldier saying, "Unless you're the
Dixie Chicks." Cartoon by Mike Peters, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2003, § 4, at 4.
168. David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism? 86 CAL. L. REV.
1377, 1381 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menard ed., 1996)).
169. See HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER
ESSAYS passim (2002) (describing how modem philosophy and some modem economics
recognize that description and evaluation infect each other); see also THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1-2 (2d ed. 1970) (describing how data is often "seen"
only if it fits the current theory for the phenomenon being considered).
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collecting the evidence." 170  True objectivity and truly disinterested
inquiry are impossible to achieve. Judgment is not suspended; rather, as
Kafka said, we live in "summary court in perpetual session." 171 If we
are always in the process of advocacy and harsh judgments, why not be
honest about it? Why not embrace it wholeheartedly?
The answer is really about one's broader framework. That there is no
complete objectivity is not an argument against there being degrees of
objectivity. 172  More fundamentally, even if one denies the classic
inquiry-toward-truth epistemological justifications for academic
freedom, suspended judgment is an ethical practice, warranted, if not
demanded, by the role professors claim for themselves and the
university. 173
If suspended judgment debilitates one from action, then at least there
is still how we hold our beliefs, and we can insist on disciplined, yoga-
like periods of re-suspended judgment in which one seriously entertains
the possibility that one's framework may be wrong. I am reminded of
Professor James Boyle remarking at a conference in 2002 that, on
reconsideration, he had found some of his most beloved theories
"mugged by brutal facts." 174 Professor Boyle was speaking in the spirit
of a scholar's cognizance of-and willingness to consider-
countervailing evidence: the personal view, the theory, should be
scrutinized, doubted, and sometimes modified. The committed partisan
170. ANDREW MILLER, OXYGEN 104 (2001).
171. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., definitive ed., 7th prtg.
1972) (1937) ("Only our concept of Time makes it possible for us to speak of the Day of
Judgment by that name; in reality it is a summary court in perpetual session.").
172. See, e.g., JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 7 (1994)
("[T]ruths about the past are possible, even if they are not absolute, and hence are worth
struggling for."). Of course, this position on historical work is, epistemologically, still a variant
on and related to a correspondence theory of truth. But it would be a mistake to think that the
making of relative (or ordered) judgments about truthfulness or objectivity necessitates a
foundation of absolute or complete truth or objectivity. See generally NOZICK, supra note 1, at
75-120 (discussing "dimensions of truth," id. at 99, and arguing that "a partial ordering of things
in terms of how objective they are" is possible, id. at 87).
173. See Rabban, supra note 168, at 1381 (describing the "ethical" view that in exchange for
academic freedom, "[s]cholars owe a corresponding obligation to be honest, careful, and
truthful"). See generally THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menard ed., 1996).
174. Similarly, in discussing historians, Richard Rorty has identified ethical obligations to
search for relevant documents and not to ignore evidence inconsistent with the historian's
personal view. See Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical
Presuppositions?, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 173, at 21, 30. In the
more ludic world of tasting foods, Calvin Trillin likes to posit what he calls the "Davis
Conundrum": "how to deal with information that may appear to call into question a tenet that is
central to a system of belief." CALVIN TRILLIN, FEEDING A YEN 121 (2003) (describing the
problem for wine critics of people who cannot, in blind taste tests, tell some red wines from white
wine).
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typically has a different reaction to countervailing evidence: the
evidence is doubted, discounted or modified (as in the joke about
Trotskyism: "The proof of the farsightedness of Trotsky's predictions is
that none of them have yet come true.").
In balancing the sometimes conflicting goals of suspended judgment
and effective involvement in public affairs, law professors may have an
easier time than other academics because law professors have an
alternative social role: the lawyer. Strong, very one-sided advocacy is
the nature of lawyering. (Modem-day lawyers are a bit like ancient
samurai: they are reviled as a group for being manipulative, wily, and
unproductive, yet at the same time, each person wants his or her own
lawyer to be the wiliest, most skillful fighter around.) A lawyer's
primary public job is to defend the interests of one side, not seek out the
truth-so much so that one scholar has described lawyering as adhering
to a standard of "nonaccountability."' 175  In many lawyering
circumstances-contract negotiations, civil suits pressing undecided
issues of law-it does not appear that any "truth" is at issue. In
circumstances where (many of us believe) objective truth is at issue-as
in a criminal trial's proof of what happened-the system, not the
individual lawyer, is given the primary truth-seeking function. In
contrast, in the privacy of the client/attorney relationship, the lawyer is
supposed to aim for an open-minded assessment of truth-indeed, a
malpractice claim can come from not telling the client all the reasonably
possible outcomes. The difference is one between counseling and
advocacy.
Assuming we accept that advocacy role the lawyer has within the
confines of the court or the conference room negotiation, the question is
whether or how we use that advocate's role for advocacy on public
issues. 176 When called to speak in testimony or media on an issue of
public importance, does the professor think of herself as counseling the
public or advocating for one side? 177 Answers may vary: I suppose
175. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 7 (1988).
176. For a simple thought experiment, how many law professors, if called upon to testify on
an issue where they had strong opinions, would be happy being identified in the record and in the
press as "Lawyer X" instead of "Professor X"? ("X" is a placeholder, not Professor Charles
Francis Xavier of the X-Men).
177. Of course, this glosses over a world of complexities. "Cause lawyering"-advocating
social policy positions in which one believes deeply-is actually "destabilizing [to] the dominant
understanding of lawyering as properly wedded to moral neutrality and technical competence"
because in the dominant paradigm, the lawyer does what the client wants and has no personal
views. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction ofAuthority, in
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (Sarat
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they will vary because, as Cass Sunstein noted, "The first problem is
that there is no single way to be a law professor."'178 But the question is
still worth asking.
If the law professor has a couple roles to choose from, are there any
similar tools available to the professor class generally? Following,
again, the idea that one can advocate degrees of objectivity without
judging things to be completely objective or subjective, let me suggest
one way that an academic can engage meaningfully in policy
discussions that is impeccable-without claiming that any other
particular course of conduct is flawed. One unimpeachable course is to
advocate a demanding standard of proof needed to justify a change in
the law and hold proponents accountable to that standard. In the face
of strong lobbying interests demanding government-mandated
encryption standards in digital television or strong, extra-copyright
protection of databases or Congressional meddling in the workings of
ICANN, it can be both principled and effective to say to the proponents
that they have not made the case for a new law. It should not be enough
for a group of lobbyists simply to tell Congress that there is a disaster of
some sort looming-and the lobbyists get what they want. It is
academics, whether scientists or law professors, who can most
effectively proselytize to legislators on questions of proof and
consistency.
There is nothing new about this general idea. As Congressman
Robert Kastenmeier and House of Representatives counsel Michael
Remington noted following the passage of the 1984 Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act, 1
79
[T]he consideration of intellectual property issues should be governed
by standards and procedures that are understood in advance and
applied uniformly from case to case. At the outset, the proponents of
change should have the burden of showing that a meritorious public
purpose is served by the proposed congressional action. 180
Let me draw some additional ideas from-and built upon-
Kastenmeier and Remington's "meritorious case" standard.
& Scheingold eds., 1998). In cause lawyering, the lawyer has overall goals that may be adverse
to the wishes or tactical best interests of her client.
178. Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 191, 199 (1999).
179. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000).
180. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 439-40 (1985) (emphasis
added). This demand for proof and consistency is kindred to seeking integrity in principles from
the state as a whole. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
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First, the standard for the meritorious case should apply to both large
and small reforms. But the grander the reform, the more burdensome
the showing should be. Small reforms, tinkering around the edges,
should require less justification. Large reforms should require a much
stronger case. Second, the burden can be met empirically or
theoretically, but the standards may vary between the two. Generally
speaking, perhaps one needs a very good empirical case or a very, very
good theoretical case for reform. 181
A legitimate criticism of this approach, as Professor Rochelle
Dreyfuss quickly pointed out to me, is that it strongly favors the status
quo. And does so with no principled reason for favoring the status quo.
Of course, she is right that there is no principled reason for favoring the
status quo. But there are a couple practical reasons to do so-one
structural, one strategic. Structurally, legislators have limited time,
energy, and attention. For that reason, one should focus on the
situations where the probability assessment of improvement is greatest
(this would be something like the sought for/predicted improvement
factored by the strength of the case that the improvement would occur).
Proponents for replacing ICANN, extending the copyright term,
accepting anything Internet-related in the Patriot Act I, making
likelihood of dilution actionable, or mandating encryption standards to
protect copyrighted works-they all need to be forced to make their
case for reform. But so too must those who would further shield ISPs
from third party liability or who would roll back business method
patents. As Kastenmeier and Remington said, the standards should be
"applied uniformly from case to case." 182
But there is also a practical strategic reason for this approach,
particularly with intellectual property. While this conservative
approach applies equally to proposals to strengthen or weaken
intellectual property, for practical purposes legislation has been
ratcheting in one direction-toward law that is stronger and stronger on
the books. Slowing down the process of legal reform in favor of the
181. I have advocated this double standard before. See Justin Hughes, Goat Boy Roams the
Halls?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (F. Scott Kieff ed.,
forthcoming Oct. 2003); Justin Hughes, Pressures on the Public Domain: Legal Pressures in
Intellectual Property Law, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND
INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 95 (Esanu & Uhlir eds., 2003); see also James Boyle &
Jennifer Jenkins, The Genius of Intellectual Property and the Need for the Public Domain, in THE
ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra,
at 10, 12 (concluding that "fundamental tinkering in the absence of strong evidence that the
tinkering is needed would not seem like the optimal strategy").
182. Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 180, at 440.
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status quo looks, for the moment, to mean slowing down the
strengthening of intellectual property laws.
Can raising questions and demanding support for a proposal be
effective? Yes. Can it be as effective as countering one side's wild
claims of impending disaster with wild claims of disaster on the other
side? Maybe not, but it can be effective enough. On this count, the
activism of scientists and law professors on database protection has
been instructive. In the mid- and late 1990s, the scientific community-
with considerable help from Professor J.H. Reichman of Duke
University and Paul Uhlir from the National Research Council-was
instrumental in slowing down proposals for strong extra-copyright
protection of databases. After an initial effort to stop an international
treaty mandating database protection, the scientific community's
activism focused on organizing conferences, promoting studies, and
raising questions about the costs and benefits of new intellectual
property legislation in this area.
To be sure, the scientific community's insistence on "inquiry" has
masked, sometimes not too subtly, a substantive point of view. As the
discussion of database protection has dragged on, the scientific
community has not done much of the kind of empirical work that would
flow naturally from the concerns they express. For example, the
National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health could
easily gather data on "data cost" as part of their grant-making process.
But, as far as I know, such an easy empirical study has not been
proposed, designed, or implemented. Of course, such a study might
show that the cost of purchasing access to pre-existing data is not
particularly great for scientists at present-and that would only help
proponents of additional database protection (giving opponents a
strategic reason not to undertake the work).
But, in their defense, the scientists should not be obliged to disprove
the need for new legislation. Again, the burden should be with the
proponents of change. The European Commission feels a need to
defend the strong sui generis protection of databases established in the
1996 EU Database Directive. To that end, they pepper their public
statements with claims that the Directive is "working" and that the EU
has seen increased commercial database production. But one
Commission official admitted that claims of increased post-Directive
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database production were based, at least in part, on counting "court
proceedings... not corporations." 83
By the meritorious case standard, the Commission would not need to
defend what is now the status quo in the European Union-were it not
for the fact that the Commission is strongly advocating adoption of
Directive-level protection in scores of other countries. It is advocating
legal change in other countries and, for that reason, it bears the burden
of showing that lack of Directive-level protection creates the kind of
market failure that intellectual property is intended to correct. 
184
In North America, there is no evidence that database production has
weakened in the post-Feist environment and, in fact, one of the major
proponents of database protection announced plans in 2000 to sell $2.5
billion worth of copyright-protected newspapers and put a substantial
chunk of those proceeds into "expanding its electronic databases" in a
program to make 80% of its revenue "come from the electronic
distribution of information" within five years. 185 That does not sound
like a business environment inhospitable to investment in databases. In
the face of such weak "evidence" all around, 186 the scientific
community is doing the right thing: a relentless beat that no case has
been made for strong database protection.
In considering ancient prophecy, Professor Stone places it in a larger
context: "All political communities face a version of this problem of
183. Interview by Stephen M. Maurer with Christian Auinger, European Commission official
(Feb. 20, 2001) (transcript on file with author); see also Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note
142.
184. The same applies when the United States advocates that other countries adopt business
method patents: the United States would have a meritorious case if it could show market failure in
those countries because of the lack of such protection.
185. Timothy Pritchard, Thomson Jumps Head First into an Electronic Future, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2000, at Cl1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. Similarly,
Barry Diller's InterActive company is "an Internet commerce conglomerate whose businesses
include the Home Shopping Network, Expedia, Inc., and Hotels.com"-which means a bunch of
businesses built on on-line databases. But when The New York Times ran an article about
financial uncertainties surrounding the company, there was not a single word about lack of
database protection. See Gretchen Morgenson, Financial Disclosure, the Barry Diller Way, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2003, §3, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
186. For example, if one even accepted that court proceedings are a way to count economic
activity, many-if not most--of the post-Directive database litigations are about databases that
were already being gathered or produced before the Directive and, therefore, do not seem to need
Directive protection as an incentive. These include telephone books, sports information
databases, stock market information, and legal databases. For an exhaustive survey of case law
under the EU Database Directive, see Inst. for Info. Law, Univ. of Amsterdam, The Database
Right File, at http://www.ivir.nUfiles/database (last updated July 25, 2003). There is no evidence
that the Directive is working, but, to be fair, we really should not expect such evidence so early
after its transposition into the various European national laws.
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true and false prophecy. How does one distinguish in political life
between the dangerous zealot, the misguided idealist, and the authentic
visionary? 187 The question here is when the scholar moves from the
relatively private world of hypothesizing among his colleagues and
enters the realm of public prophecy, how does he distinguish between
his own idealism and "authentic vision." It is not easy. As one of
Raymond Radiguet's characters observes, looking back at his earlier,
youthful ideas, "My clarity of vision was nothing more than a more
dangerous form of my naivete." 188 For anyone who is blessed with the
uncertainty of suspended judgment, I suggest a simple, yet often
effective standard to avoid the dilemma: demand that the proponents of
change make a stronger case than we have typically allowed them to get
away with.
V. CONCLUSION
We might be tempted to call making predictions about the future an
occupational hazard of professors, were it not an integral part of the
occupation. The same can be said of simplifying our views, visions, and
arguments in order to make them clearer, more interesting, or more
persuasive-that simplification would be a hazard to be avoided, if it
were not part of the process. 189
In the area of copyright, American courts have declined to embrace a
forceful vision of the relationship between free expression, democratic
society, and intellectual property rights that law professors laid out in
the wake of the Supreme Court's 1991 Feist decision. The law
professors have been in the vanguard, but there has yet to be any guard
to follow them. Whether for structural or accidental reasons, the same
visionary impulse did not inspire American legal academics to foresee
how much the Internet would propel issues of "convergence" or partial
harmonization among the commercial laws of nations connected to the
cyberspace. Policymakers and private actors found themselves ahead of
the American academic community in reacting to the transnational
nature of the Internet's legal issues.
187. Stone, Prophesy, Trust, and Authority, supra note 149, at 7.
188. RAYMOND RADIGUET, LE DIABLE AU CORPS 106 (1923) ("Ma clairvoyance n'dtait
qu'une forme plus dangereuse de ma naYvetd.").
189. This way of formulating the point comes from J.L. AUSTIN, HOW To Do THINGS WITH
WORDS 38 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisa eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1975) (1962) ("We
must at all costs avoid over-simplification, which one might be tempted to call the occupational
disease of philosophers if it were not their occupation.").
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"Convergence" is a popular idea these days, 190 but the convergence
in law being wrought by the Internet is not a wholly new kind of legal
harmonization. Bilateral and multilateral trade treaties-stretching back
centuries-represent a history of steps, sometimes very small steps,
toward harmonization of law. To some observers, harmonization has
not proceeded very far; to other observers, it has gone far indeed. Each
side can mount its own evidence. Those emphasizing how little
harmonization has actually occurred would point to the wide world of
legal idiosyncracies that abide. Indian copyright law, for example,
defines "performers" to include snake charmers. 19 1
Those seeing significant harmonization would make the kind of
presentation made in Part III above. Increasing economic globalization
would have increased the pace of this covergence in law even without
the Internet. But in keeping with the many observations that the pace of
change on the Internet is significantly faster than in the physical
world, 192 the Internet may have pushed us into a higher trajectory of
faster, deeper convergence.
As for our modem day prophets, professors are to be commended for
their activism-both for its positive results and for their strength and
courage to wade into these policy battles. Writing in a very different
context, James Baldwin's words aptly describe the courage simply in
moving from the academic sidelines into policy activism: "To act is to
be committed, and to be committed is to be in danger."' 193 Danger that
one's substantive views will be lambasted-as well as danger that one's
role will, as in these pages, come under scrutiny.
190. See, e.g., Edward Alden, US Rediscovers Value of Transatlantic Link, FIN. TIMES, June
25, 2003, at 3 (quoting American official who is "struck by a convergence in European and
American thinking" about security issues), available at 2003 WL 57314251.
191. The Copyright Act of 1957 §2(q) (India), http://www.naukri.com/lls/copyright/
sectionl .htm#2 (amended 1994).
192. The example of business method patents comes to mind. One is the argument that
business method patents over Internet applications should have a significantly shorter term of
protection because "the software world moves five times faster than the industrial one that the
patent system was designed to protect." Damien Cave, Patently Bezos, SALON.COM, at
http://www.archives.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/03/16/patent/ (Mar. 16, 2000). How one would
actually measure such a difference is a much more difficult problem.
193. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 9 (1963).
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